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Abstract 
 
This paper is about how the world reestablishes international tax order.   
 
The paper focuses on the OECD’s work on profit reallocation and asks whether this 
multilateral effort can be successful in stabilizing the international tax system.  The 
analysis centers on the current leading concepts for reallocating profit among jurisdictions 
under what is known as “Pillar One” of the OECD work programme.  To analyze whether 
any Pillar One concept can be turned into a stable multilateral regime, it is necessary to 
specify certain elements of what a proposal to reallocate profits might entail.  Accordingly, 
this paper sets out two strawman proposals.  One strawman uses a “market intangibles” 
concept that explicitly separates routine and residual returns.  The other strawman may 
reach a similar result, but does not explicitly attempt to separate routine and residual 
returns. Instead, in current OECD parlance, it might be described as a “distribution-
based” approach.  
 
The paper asks whether either of the two strawmen could be agreed and stabilized 
multilaterally given the tools of  modern international tax diplomacy. I conclude that the 
current procedural and institutional architecture for cementing international tax relations 
among states is inadequate to stabilize either of the strawmen. Nevertheless, with certain 
changes, reestablishing order may be possible.  Moreover, I conclude that there are six 
key structural decisions that impact the ability to stabilize the international tax architecture 
in any Pillar One approach, and that these decisions are likely to be implicitly made in the 
course of choosing a political direction for Pillar One work in 2019.  The choices made 
with regard to these decisions determine whether or not it will be possible to stabilize Pillar 
One.   
 
Even if good resolutions are reached along these six dimensions, there are only a couple 
paths to stabilize the system.  One path would involve using every tool in the current OECD 
arsenal in new and more expansive ways, and then substantially depoliticize international 
tax matters and remove G20 involvement, such that logics of appropriateness developed 
among tax administrators isolated from political pressures and acting through 
transnational networks could lend stability to a new set of rules and principles.  Even then, 
only a few Pillar One compromises could be stabilized this way.  The alternative path, 
which could stabilize a broader range of proposals, requires formalizing the new regime 
in international law through a true multilateral treaty. 
                                               
1  Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I thank Zenia Memon for excellent research 
assistance and Will Morris, Michael Plowgian, and participants at the Oxford Centre for Business Taxation’s 
2019 Summer Conference and Academic Symposium for helpful conversations.  All errors are my own. 
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Introduction 
 
Can a new system for corporate profit allocation in the cross-border setting be agreed to 
and implemented by tax authorities in a manner that provides for stable and consistent 
international coordination and enforcement?   
 
In May 2019 the OECD released a work programme that involves undertaking a 
comprehensive review of profit allocation and nexus rules.  The OECD labels this work as 
“Pillar One” of a two-part work programme. The work programme presents the skeletal 
outlines of various proposals to reallocate corporate cross-border income taxing rights.  It 
also includes a basic workplan to address technical issues that need to be resolved if any 
proposal is to be operationalized.  The goal of the workplan is to provide input to a political 
decision on the outlines of a proposal for a consensus-based reallocation of taxing rights.   
 
Given the political pressures for change to profit allocation rules, it is important that the 
Inclusive Framework considers¾including during the initial work to set a political 
direction¾what legal and political instruments would be required to implement and 
stabilize any given proposal under Pillar One. Though the workplan alludes to this issue, 
to date the concern has not been widely discussed in public. Nor does the workplan 
underscore the importance of the issue.  This paper therefore presents the available 
stabilization mechanisms and the considerations for when they can and cannot be effective. 
 
The paper suggests that decisions reached along six key dimensions will determine what 
set of tools will be required for there to be a chance of stabilizing the agreed Pillar One 
approach. It seems likely that some or all of these six key decisions will implicitly be 
reached in settling on a “general approach,” to Pillar One. As a result, immediate 
consideration as to the impact of those six decisions for the prospect of stabilizing the 
international tax architecture is advisable. 
 
To consider the question, some background on the extant multilateral system of governance 
in international tax affairs is required.  That system currently involves two interrelated but 
quite different mechanisms for coordinating international tax affairs among jurisdictions; 
a G-20 soft law mechanism and a model treaty-based mechanism.2  Part I of this paper first 
outlines these two mechanisms for achieving international coordination in corporate 
income tax matters.  It then sets out the possibility of a true multilateral treaty, which is not 
a part of the current international tax landscape.  Part II explores the proposals for 
reallocating taxing rights that are currently being discussed at the OECD.  Part II first 
highlights that the parameters of this new concept are somewhat uncertain.  I then outline 
two hypothetical versions of a Pillar One “solution” drawn from my interpretation of the 
                                               
2 Itai Grinberg, The New International Tax Diplomacy, 104 GEO. L.J. 1137 (2016). (describing the evolution 
of these mechanisms). 
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OECD’s recent public consultation document,3 features of the public consultation itself, 
and the work programme.  I do not intend these two hypothetical solutions to be indicative 
of my predictions of where the OECD process will end up.  Rather, I hope they set out two 
extremes among the plausible range of possibilities.  By so doing, the strawmen allow me 
to highlight key structural considerations that should be taken into account if relatively 
stable and consistent international coordination and enforcement is a desired goal of the 
present Pillar One negotiation.  Part III asks whether it is possible and what it would take 
to stabilize either of the two strawman versions of Pillar One set out in Part II.  One relevant 
question in this regard is whether the extant mechanisms for achieving international 
coordination in corporate income tax matters (as described in Part I) would suffice, or 
whether a true multilateral treaty would be required. 
 
Part III suggests that the simplest extant proposal to alter profit allocation rules just might 
be implemented using a combination of tools previously used multilaterally by the OECD 
in the international tax area. In contrast, other proposals require a truly multilateral treaty 
on substantive taxing rights.  Such a treaty has not previously been agreed upon by the 
nations of the world, despite having been discussed on and off for a hundred years.  
 
Note that this paper never evaluates whether either of the strawmen, or any existing 
proposal for reallocating taxing rights, is normatively desirable.  In a prior paper, I 
expressed substantial doubts about the conceptual basis and the administrative feasibility 
of both the “user participation” concept and certain versions of the “market intangibles” 
concept that have received a great deal of public discussion.4  This paper does not revisit 
those issues; my silence on normative matters is not meant to indicate approval (or 
disapproval) of any proposal discussed herein.   
 
Rather, this paper is motivated by, and focused on, the question of international tax order.  
My interest in international tax order is fundamentally conservative; I view order in this 
area as a value in and of itself, regardless of what the substantive outcome of multilateral 
discussions on profit allocation might be. The two strawmen proposals I set out are 
accordingly meant simply to highlight important stabilization considerations that arise in 
the Pillar One debate.   
 
I.  Existing Mechanisms for Multilateral Coordination in International Tax Matters 
 
A. The G20 Economic Soft Law Model 
 
Most commentators would agree that the BEPS project was¾before the current attempt to 
reallocate taxing rights and agree a global minimum tax regime¾the most extensive effort 
                                               
3  OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy: Public Consultation 
Document, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (2019) [hereinafter Consultation Document], 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-document-addressing-the-tax-challenges-of-the-
digitalisation-of-the-economy.pdf. 
4 See Itai Grinberg, International Taxation in an Era of Digital Disruption: Analyzing the Current Debate, 
TAXES 85-118 (Mar. 2019). 
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to reset multilateral international corporate income tax norms since those norms were 
established under the auspices of the League of Nations in the 1920s.   
 
A key procedural feature of the BEPS project was that it arose through G20 convocation.  
The G20 framework for international economic regulation is a “top-down” architecture, in 
which G20 convocation and agenda setting provides the impetus for law- and regulation-
making.  G20 led international economic regulation usually involves a request at G20 level 
for international coordination around standards to be created by a specific “standard-setter” 
that the G20 convenes.  When it takes this step, the G20 also often asks for the 
establishment of monitoring bodies, enforcement vehicles, and technical assistance 
providers (“enablers”) to support compliance with the new international economic 
regulatory standards. 
 
Once standards are set, a monitoring body may determine whether national regulators are 
complying with a standard, potentially imposing discipline.  Enforcement mechanisms are 
often established or threatened by the G20 and tied to the monitoring bodies’ judgments.  
Finally, jurisdictions that lack the human capital needed to meet the standards may be 
offered technical assistance.5   
 
This G20-based institutional and procedural system for multilateral action, which was 
adopted for the BEPS project, has existed for a longer period of time in other areas of 
international economic law.  For example, the G20, working through the Financial Stability 
Board as a “standard-setter,” helped create monitoring bodies, enforcement mechanisms, 
and enablers that together represent a soft-law framework for what is now sometimes 
referred to as “international financial law.”6  The procedural similarities for G20 Soft Law 
made across various subdisciplines of international economic law allows some trans-
substantive lessons to be drawn from historical experiences across subfields.     
 
One such lesson from the history of G7 and G20 engagement with initiatives in various 
areas of international economic affairs is that once those bodies engage an issue area within 
international economic law, they tend to not disengage. 7  In BEPS, the G20 certainly 
engaged with international tax.  Moreover, in recent months both the OECD Centre for Tax 
Policy and Administration Director Pascal Saint-Amans, and EU Commissioner Pierre 
                                               
5 CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
61-114 (2d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press 2015).  Before the G20’s emergence as a major player in 2008, the 
G7 had played a similar role. 
6 See Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (And How It Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257 
(2011). 
7 The G7 and G20 have made and sustained open-ended commitments to involvement in at least a dozen 
areas of international economic law over the last two decades.  In contrast, the author’s investigations suggest 
only two areas where the G7/G20 committed to a subject and subsequently fully disengaged with the issue 
prior to the election of Donald Trump: these are the Doha trade round, during which the Leaders involvement 
was emphasized from 2008-2012, but set aside in 2013 as Doha appeared to collapse; and International 
Organization of Securities Commissions [“IOSCO”] reporting on the functioning of credit default swap 
markets.  See Goodbye Doha, Hello Bali, ECONOMIST (Sept. 8, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21562196; The Credit Default Swap Market Report, IOSCO (2012), 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD385.pdf (concluding IOSCO’s research).  
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Moscovici have suggested that in a G20 environment that is otherwise deeply contentious, 
tax appears to be emerging as the anomalous success story where countries continue to 
cooperate.  As a result, processes akin to the G20-led features of the BEPS project 8 are 
likely to have an important role in the current debate over reallocation of taxing rights.  In 
Parts II and III of this paper I will refer to these processes as the “G20 Soft Law Approach”. 
Importantly, the G20 Soft Law Approach has the corollary effect of displacing “bottom-
up” transnational governance by means of technocratic networks. Historically, multilateral 
dialogue about international tax matters did not rise above the level of the Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs at the OECD, a body whose membership consisted of leading technocrats 
with authority over international tax affairs in their respective countries.9   Topics for 
consideration by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs were most often generated by means of 
prior, often multiyear discussions in the Committee on Fiscal Affairs’ subsidiary bodies, 
staffed by lower-level technocrats.10Prior to the BEPS project, international tax diplomacy 
largely had this “bottom up” character and thus, multilateral agreement on changes to 
international tax norms happened slowly and deliberately, with significant OECD projects 
involving even moderate changes to agreed-upon principles often taking as much as a 
decade from onset to completion.11  
All that began to change in 2009.  At their London meeting in 2009, the leaders of the 
G20 12  endorsed a “more cooperative” international tax environment as part of their 
response to the financial crisis.13  For two years, the G20 limited its efforts in international 
taxation to the area of tax administrative cooperation, bank secrecy, and issues related to 
offshore tax evasion by individuals and families.14  Then, in 2012, the G20 identified BEPS 
                                               
8 See generally Itai Grinberg, The New International Tax Diplomacy, 104 GEO. L.J. 1137 (2016). 
9 Hugh Ault, Reflections on the Role of the OECD in Developing International Tax Norms, 34 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 757, 760 (2009).  For instance, the representative of the United States at the CFA has usually been 
the International Tax Counsel of the United States or the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury 
(International Tax).  Id.  
10 Id. at 761. 
11 Id. at 762-63.  For example, the OECD’s Report on Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments 
was over a decade in the making.  Id. 
12 The G20 describes itself as “the premier forum for its members’ international economic cooperation and 
decision-making.” About G20, G20, http://g20.org.tr/about-g20/ (last visited May 29, 2019).  
13 The G20’s London Declaration explicitly committed to a “new cooperative tax environment,” and that 
commitment has been reiterated at each subsequent G20 meeting. Communiqué, G20, Declaration on 
Strengthening the Financial System—London, at 5 (Apr. 2, 2009), [hereinafter London Communiqué], 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-g20/Documents /London %20April% 
202009%20Fin_Deps_Fin_Reg_Annex_020409_-_1615_final.pdf, http://perma.cc/4NG7-M657.   
14 Cross-border administrative cooperation in tax matters was the one area of international tax matters in 
which the G20—and previously the G-7—had maintained some level of continuing involvement since 1997.  
See Communiqué, G-8, Confronting Global Economic and Financial Challenges—Denver, at para. 33 
(1997), available at http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/g8_documents/archives_from_previous 
_summits/denver_summit_-_1997/confronting_global_economic_and_financial_challenges.html; London 
Communiqué, supra note 14, at 4–5.  See also Itai Grinberg, The Battle Over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 
UCLA L. REV. 304, 313–317 (2012). Eventually the G20 Finance Ministers’ interest in transparency and 
information exchange expanded into a commitment to developing a global standard on automatic information 
exchange that would make information on offshore accounts broadly available to tax administrations around 
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as a threat to the G20’s own public fiscs and, amidst a period of politically unpopular 
austerity following the financial crisis, and broadened its interest in international tax affairs 
to encompass the taxation of multinational corporations (“MNCs”).15   The “action items” 
eventually endorsed by the G20 in the BEPS project took the same “top-down” G20 Soft 
Law Approach that the G20 had used in other areas of international economic law, and 
then in the battle against offshore tax evasion.  In the process, a long-established process 
of technocratic “bottom-up” multilateral decision-making in international taxation was 
largely displaced.  A decade on, although the new procedural architecture for international 
tax diplomacy may seem well-entrenched, it is of relatively recent vintage. 
B. The OECD Model Treaty and the Multilateral Instrument 
 
The international tax regime also includes a substantial treaty-based component in the form 
of a network of more than 3,000 bilateral tax treaties.16  Although it is technically soft law, 
the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (the “OECD Model Treaty”) 
informs the content of this tax treaty network in a way that is surprisingly self-enforcing.   
 
Like the outputs of G20 Soft Law diplomatic processes, the OECD Model Treaty is a “soft 
law” instrument.  However, in contrast to most G20 Soft Law Approach agreements of the 
type described in part IA, changes to the OECD Model Treaty and its commentaries (the 
“Commentary”) impact the legal and administrative outcomes in taxation quite directly.  
Not only are the OECD Model Treaty and Commentary (together, the “OECD Model”) 
highly influential, but in some instances, changes to the OECD Model are automatically 
incorporated into domestic law and administrative practice in many countries around the 
world.   
 
The treatment of the OECD Model (particularly the Commentary) by both national courts 
and tax administrations, make the negotiation of treaty-based changes to the OECD Model 
akin to a single-stage negotiating game among states.  My full views on the special status 
of the OECD Model as an instrument of soft law are described in Itai Grinberg, The New 
International Tax Diplomacy, 104 Geo. L.J. 1137 (2016).  For purposes of this paper, it 
suffices to note that there are three key interlocking features of international tax policy, 
administration, and jurisprudence in a large number of states that give the OECD Model 
special force.  First, the manner in which domestic courts and tax administrations17 in many 
countries around the world treat the Commentary substantially prewires an enforcement 
                                               
the world. Communiqué, G20, Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (Apr. 19, 2013), 
available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013 -0419-finance.html. 
15 The G20 addressed the BEPS issue as part of its declaration about “reforming the financial sector and 
fostering financial inclusion.” Communiqué, G20, G20 Leaders Declaration in Los Cabos, at 6-9 (June 19, 
2012), [hereinafter Los Cabos Communiqué], available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2012/2012-0619-
loscabos.pdf. 
 
17 For example, the Chilean Revenue Service, during the period that Chile was a non-OECD member, issued 
a circular indicating that the OECD Model and Commentary’s interpretation of the concept of “beneficial 
owner” should be used to interpret Chile’s tax treaties because Chile intended to follow the OECD Model 
interpretation in this regard.  Chilean Revenue Service, Circular Letter Nª57/2009. 
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mechanism for changes to the OECD Model Treaty,18 despite its technical status as soft 
law.  Second, the “ambulatory theory” of treaty interpretation endorsed by the OECD, as 
well as tax administrations and national courts in various states, means that, as a practical 
matter, agreements to amend the Commentary, either in conjunction with or independent 
of changes to the OECD Model Treaty, significantly alter the legal meaning of existing tax 
treaties as well as tax treaties agreed to in the future.  Finally, at least within the OECD, 
tax treaty negotiators feel substantially constrained to accept model treaty provisions in 
their future negotiations with other sovereigns where they have not registered a reservation 
or observation with respect to a given OECD Model Treaty provision.   For these reasons, 
the existence of the OECD Model Treaty acts as an independent variable that affects 
international tax governance and differentiates the political economy of international tax 
affairs from what happens in other areas of international economic law. 
 
The advent of the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to 
Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“MLI”) in the BEPS project bolstered the legal 
efficacy of changes to the OECD Model.19 The MLI substantially streamlined the process 
by which tax treaty-based rules in existing bilateral treaties can be modified by 
participating states to incorporate agreements reached at the OECD. The MLI makes 
agreeing changes to the OECD Model and then choosing not to implement the changes 
more difficult for treaty negotiators because the two choices are highly proximate in time, 
rather than years apart.  In part III of the paper I will refer to any process involving agreeing 
to amendments to, or new articles for, the OECD Model and incorporating these provisions 
into a further protocol to the existing MLI as the “MLI Approach.”20   
 
C. A Real Multilateral Treaty 
 
Importantly, the existing OECD MLI is structured to bring new articles and other changes 
into force in existing tax treaties, without abandoning the basic bilateral structure of the tax 
                                               
18 For example, the tax treaty between Colombia and Chile, neither OECD members at the time their treaty 
was negotiated, indicates that both States agree that when their treaties use the language of the OECD Model, 
the Commentary to the OECD Model should be considered as complementary means of interpretation of the 
treaty under the terms of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, regardless of 
the fact that the two countries are non-OECD members.  Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 
Sentencia C-5777/2009 (Colom.), http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/RELATORIA/2009/C-577-
09.htm.  
19 The advent of the MLI also raises questions about the efficacy of amendments to the OECD Model that 
are not eventually included in an MLI.  From the ratification of the MLI going forward, only changes against 
the 2018 OECD Model baseline included in an MLI are likely to be viewed to be true multilateral consensus 
items.   
20 For purposes of this paper, Part VI of the MLI is particularly important.  That portion of the MLI provides 
a vehicle for states to agree to a single cohesive mandatory binding arbitration provision as between 
competent authorities of two agreeing states.  Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related 
Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Part IV, opened for signature Dec. 31, 2016, 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-treaty-related-measures-to-
prevent-BEPS.pdf; and Explanatory Statement to the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty 
Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting ¶¶ 19-20, 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/explanatory-statement-multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-treaty-
related-measures-to-prevent-BEPS.pdf. 
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treaty system.  Therefore, the OECD MLI cannot be used as a substitute to negotiating a 
tax treaty for a pair of jurisdictions between which no tax treaty existed before. Moreover, 
the MLI’s commitment to the bilateral treaty structure makes it challenging to use the MLI 
to change the range of topics that the tax treaty system covers.  In other words, the MLI 
structure is not conducive to changing which legal questions associated with taxing cross-
border activities are addressed without, as opposed to within, the tax treaty architecture.21  
Indeed, the original Report to the G20 on the MLI seemed to suggest that modifying these 
boundaries could be inappropriate given the overarching importance countries place on tax 
sovereignty.22  
 
“[I]n tax matters, the concept of sovereignty underpins the stable tax framework 
within which governments have been able to facilitate arrangements that allowed 
for the benefits of globalization to flow to all market economies… Recognizing the 
tax sovereignty concern, the report focuses on implementing treaty measures, even 
though a multilateral instrument could in principle also be used to express 
commitments to implement domestic law measures.”23 
 
A true multilateral instrument, unlike the OECD MLI, would not modify a series of existing 
bilateral agreements.  Nor would it be reduceable to a compilation of bilateral, state-to-
state obligations.  Rather, such an agreement would include collective obligations that 
could not always be reduced into a bundle of bilateral components.24  In this paper I 
describe stabilizing a new profit allocation regime using a legal instrument that does not 
require a prior bilateral tax treaty between the signatories, and is not reduceable to a bundle 
of bilateral obligations, as the “Multilateral Treaty Approach.”   
 
Notably, the tax experts brought together by the League of Nations, who in the 1920s and 
1930s did the initial work that underlies the OECD Model Treaty, originally conceived of 
their proposed tax treaty as a true multilateral treaty.25  The 1963 OECD Model Treaty was 
similarly intended as a model for a multilateral tax treaty as among OECD member states. 
As late as 1977, OECD tax treaty documents still encouraged considering a multilateral 
approach where feasible.26   
 
Nevertheless, a true multilateral tax treaty of broad applicability (not to mention any form 
of “international tax organization”) has never been given serious political consideration.  It 
would, at minimum, require “strong impetus at the highest political level” to achieve 
“political acceptance from a critical mass of jurisdictions” for a multilateral negotiation of 
                                               
21 Multilateral Instrument, supra note 3, at 20-21.   
22 Id. at 16. 
23 Id. at 26. 
24 Cf. Joost Pauwelyn, A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or 
Collective in Nature?, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 907 (2003). 
25 Report Presented by the Fiscal Comm. on the Work of the Third Session of the Committee, League of 
Nations Doc. C.415.M.171 1931 II (1931) (Appendix I-III).    
26  See Jeffrey Owen & Mary Bennett, OECD Model Tax Convention, OECD Observer (Oct. 2008), 
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/2756/OECD_Model_Tax_Convention.html; Klaus 
Vogel, supra note 3. 
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that type to even be contemplated.27  Although anything can happen, it is not clear that we 
are at a political moment marked by the strong commitment to international economic 
multilateralism that could be required to launch such a negotiation.   
 
II.  The Possible Faces of Market Intangibles: Two Indicative Methodologies 
 
The question posed by this paper requires exploring the profit reallocation concepts being 
discussed at the OECD, even though their parameters are somewhat uncertain.  
Accordingly, this section of the paper sets out two hypothetical proposals that represent 
two “extremes” among a set of possible specifications of a “market intangibles”28 proposal 
that does not involve fractional apportionment.  
 
I will refer to the two strawman approaches put forth in this paper as the “capital 
expenditures method” (“CE Method”) and the “operating margins method (“OM 
Method”).29  These “strawman” proposals are intended to be directionally consistent with 
the language in the OECD public consultation document; the content of the public 
consultation itself; the OECD Work Programme; and public remarks made in various 
venues by the leading international tax officials of the largest economies participating in 
the Inclusive Framework and the OECD Secretariat.  Importantly, various features of the 
CE Method described below could be ported into an OM Method structure, and various 
features of the OM Method could be ported into a CE Method structure.  Nothing about 
the two proposals makes them incapable of incorporating individual features of the other; 
and many of the features of each method could (with greater complexity) be combined.   
 
Moreover, the purpose of the strawmen is not to suggest they are leading Pillar One options, 
or that they are exactly what the OECD is presently discussing.  Rather, the purpose of Part 
II is to lay out hypotheticals that motivate the analysis in Part III.  The key question, 
addressed in Part III, is whether any version of the Pillar One proposals could be 
successfully enforced over time on a multilaterally coordinated basis (“stabilized”), and 
what technical features might increase or decrease the likelihood that an agreement could 
                                               
27 Multilateral Instrument, supra note 3, at 17.  
28 Unfortunately, nomenclature in the current profit reallocation debate is often a source of real difficulty.  
Different people use different nomenclature to mean the same thing; different people use the same 
nomenclature to mean different things.  The OECD itself has now used different nomenclature to mean the 
same thing.  Thus, for the sake of clarity, in this paper I adopt and explain my own nomenclature. 
29 The CE Method is clearly a “market intangibles” idea, whereas the OM Method is more of a “distribution-
based” idea.  Neither of the strawmen begin with arm’s length valuation of the respective value of the two 
groups of intangibles.  \The OECD already seems to have dismissed a full arm’s length valuation approach. 
See Consultation Document, supra note 4, at 14 n.6; Programme of Work to Develop a Consensus Solution 
to the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy, OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on 
BEPS, ch II (May 29, 2019) [hereinafter Work Programme], available at 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/programme-of-work-to-develop-a-consensus-solution-to-the-tax-challenges-
arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy.pdf. The consultation document does, however, contemplate 
a conceptual distinction between profits generated by “market intangibles” (e.g. proprietary market and 
customer data, customer lists, customer relationships, and other customer information, as well as attributes 
such as branding and trade names),  and those generated by “trade intangibles.” The MRPS approach suggests 
similar ideas. 
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be stabilized multilaterally.  The purpose of this Part II is simply to create a basis from 
which to “show the analytical work.”   
 
Note that the descriptions below do not provide any guidance as to how to determine 
destination for those goods and services, and that this determination is a necessary 
component of both proposals.  The destination determination issue is described in 
significant detail in a prior paper of mine.30 While I make no further comments on that 
issue in this paper, I do view that difficulty as an important source of technical instability 
in any market intangibles concept. Indeed, I believe a solution to this gating issue must be 
found and clearly articulated if chaos under Pillar One is to be avoided.31 I previously 
suggested that we do not presently have a publicly-known workable solution to this 
problem.32  The importance of the issue is therefore hard to understate. I understand the 
OECD is now consulting quite widely on the destination determination question. 
 
Since the destination determination issue affects every conceivable Pillar One proposal, it 
turns out not a consideration as to which type of Pillar One approach to support, at least 
once one has decided to support any Pillar One proposal at all.  This basic reality explains 
why the destination determination question is excluded from this paper. 
 
A. Capital Expenditure Method 
 
The CE Method would begin by separating “excess” or “residual” returns from “routine 
returns.” 33  The CE Method provides a normal rate of return to productive economic 
functions.  It uses arm’s length methods to determine this return, on the theory that the 
arm’s length method works reasonably well in the context of determining appropriate “non-
entrepreneurial” returns for specific economic activities.  Then, to allocate the remaining 
“entrepreneurial,” “non-routine,” or “residual” returns, the CE Method in effect deems the 
country in which customer sales take place to be an “entrepreneurial” affiliate with respect 
to local market sales.  The CE Method treats part of the “non-routine” or “residual profits 
                                               
30 Itai Grinberg, International Taxation in an Era of Digital Disruption: Analyzing the Current Debate, 
TAXES 85-118 (Mar. 2019). 
31 Some suggested solutions, which I view as unsatisfactory for reasons explained in Grinberg, supra note 5, 
are provided in the Skadden Arps submission to the OECD public consultation.  Skadden, Arps, Slate, 
Meagher & Flom LLP, Comments on Public Consultation Document: Addressing the Tax Challenges of the 
Digitalization of the Economy (Mar. 6, 2019) [hereinafter Skadden Consultation Document], available at 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/hou6dvuckmahoft/OECD-Comments-Received-Digital-March-
2019.zip?dl=0&file_subpath=%2FSkadden.pdf. 
32 Grinberg, supra note 5.  
33 The CE Method raises various technical challenges.  My prior paper focused on pragmatic administrative 
issues associated with implementing the proposal.  In contrast, this paper focuses only on stabilizing the 
implementation and utilization of a market intangibles proposal internationally.  Thus, my description of the 
method in this section does not restate the pragmatic administrative issues that I believe are raised by the CE 
Method, except to the extent these are relevant to stabilizing the proposal within the international tax system. 
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to be due to “market intangibles,” and allocates that part of the non-routine profits to the 
“entrepreneurial” affiliate in the market country.34    
 
Thus, splitting the residual profit between profits being allocated to market intangibles, and 
profits being allocated to other intangibles, is necessary in the CE Method.  The CE Method 
for arriving at that split would involve specifying which expenditures contribute to 
developing market intangibles and which expenditures contribute to developing other 
intangibles (notably including production intangibles).  Governments would then establish 
– presumably on a presumptive basis – “useful lives” for various buckets of expenditure.   
The “amortization schedule” adopted for the various buckets of expenditure would not 
produce actual deductions.  Rather, the resulting relative “capitalized values” associated 
with functional costs incurred for market intangibles as compared to other intangibles 
would simply establish an annual ratio of “market intangibles” to “other intangibles” 
hereinafter referred to as the “CE Method Ratio”.35 
 
The CE Method Ratio would determine the ratio of excess return to be allocated through 
the current arm’s length system as compared to the excess return to be allocated to market 
jurisdictions in the CE Method. 36 Various mechanisms could be utilized to establish the 
CE Method Ratio. For purposes of the analysis in this paper, all that matters is that a CE 
Method Ratio is somehow established, based on the facts and circumstances of an 
individual taxpayer. 
 
In the simplest case (assumed here), governments would agree to assign the same useful 
life for all buckets of expenditure. In that case, the only purpose of the amortization 
schedule would be to “average out” expenditures contributing to market intangibles, and 
expenditures contributing to other intangibles, over multiple years. Even so, the CE Method 
Ratio would change each year as a result of new expenditures by the MNC as well as the 
operation of the “amortization schedule.”   
 
The CE Method analysis could be undertaken on a consolidated MNC basis or, with 
substantially increased complexity, on a business unit or product line basis.  The amount 
of residual return deemed attributable to market intangibles would then be allocated among 
market jurisdictions based on the percentage of gross sales revenue by country.  
                                               
34 See presentation of Michael Devereux at Tax Policy Center Conference on “A Corporate Tax for the 21st 
Century” (July 14, 2016), available at https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/residual-profit-
allocation-proposal_2.pdf . 
35 The CE Method splits residual profits based on relative stocks of accumulated and capitalized “functional” 
costs.  In that sense, the CE Method bears some similarity to the Functional Cost Diagnostic (“FCD”) Model 
announced by the IRS’ Advanced Pricing and Mutual Agreement Program (“APMA”).  Functional Cost 
Diagnostic Model, KPMG (Feb. 15, 2019), https://home.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2019/03/tnf-irs-
diagnostic-model-mar4-2019.pdf.  
36 In theory, the CE Method Ratio could function as a safe harbor. Some have suggested MNCs might be 
allowed to elect either the safe harbor method or, as an alternative means to computing their CE Method 
Ratio, a purer facts and circumstances transfer pricing valuation method for market intangibles on one hand 
and trade intangibles on the other. Skadden Consultation Document, supra note 29.  However, it is unclear 
what would motivate governments to provide this election.  The already high risk of controversy would 
increase without obvious systemic revenue or compliance gains.   
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The CE Method requires global consolidation (unitary taxation) because it requires a 
measure of taxable income at the consolidated level in order to measure the amount of 
residual return. Most discussion of market intangibles and residual profit allocation more 
generally in the OECD process assumes “top-down” calculations, and therefore implicitly 
requires this form of global consolidation.37 Thus, all the issues that arise in unitary tax 
systems also arise in the CE Method. The tax base harmonization conundrum associated 
with unitary taxation is well-known. 
 
B. The Operating Margins Method  
 
The OM Method departs from the conceptual motivation for “market intangibles” 
proposals in the interest of administrative ease. 38  Taken as a whole, the resulting 
methodology is difficult to relate to the conceptual motivation for market intangibles.  
Importantly, advocates of simplified approaches might suggest that an appropriately 
calibrated OM Method-based proposal may, in practice, produce results that are no more 
or less likely to allocate only “market intangible” profit to market jurisdictions than the CE 
Method.39   
 
The OM Method has a conceptual relationship to the deemed profit methods that were 
common in Latin America a generation ago.  Modified deemed profits method approaches 
were raised as an alternative in the same section of the OECD consultation document that 
presented the G24’s “significant economic presence” proposal.  Thus, the OM Method 
                                               
37 In theory, an alternative mechanism for determining the amount of residual income allocable to each 
jurisdiction could be developed from the “bottom-up”  Such an approach is described as an alternative in an 
Oxford group paper. Michael P. Devereux, Alan J. Auerbach, Paul Oosterhuis, Wolfgang Schön and John 
Vella, Residual Profit Allocation by Income (Oxford International Tax Group, Working Paper No. 19/01, 
2019) [hereinafter RPA-I], https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2019-03/WP1901_0.pdf.  The details 
of the Oxford group’s “bottom-up” system are not essential to the analysis in this paper.  Nevertheless, it is 
worth observing that the Oxford group’s “bottom-up” system remains unitary in the sense that it requires a 
unitary definition of indirect expenses (notably including interest expense, global non-allocable sales and 
marketing expenses, R&D expenses, and other general and administrative expenses) that must then be 
allocated out according to a consistent and agreed multilateral system.  Second, the Oxford group’s “bottom-
up” system would only be workable if the concept of “residual gross income” developed in the RPA-I paper 
were adopted by all jurisdictions consistently and used by each of them as the allocation key for indirect 
expenses.  Third, and most importantly, the RPA-I “bottom-up” method results in an allocation of all residual 
profits to the destination jurisdiction.  In contrast, in a market intangibles concept, some mechanism is needed 
to split residual profits being allocated to market intangibles from residual profits being allocated to the 
destination jurisdiction.  Methodologically, a ”bottom-up” approach (unlike a ”top-down” approach) for the 
CE Method would have to “take away” profits initially allocated to the destination country from that market 
country.  Given the politics of the market intangibles debate, that last result seems extremely politically 
challenging. 
38 On the other hand, the OECD TPG already hints that sometimes it is worth considering the “trade-off 
between strict compliance with the arm’s length principle and administrability.”  OECD, OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 2017, ¶4.112 (2017) [hereinafter 
OECD TPG], https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/tpG2017-en. 
39 In other words, advocates would say the OM Method usually would in practice allocate only residual 
returns and returns that are the result of functions in market jurisdictions to market jurisdictions. 
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might be thought of as a compromise between the original U.S. Treasury proposal for 
restructuring profit allocation, and ideas put forth by the G24.40 
 
The OM Method would specify a minimum taxable income due from a multinational group 
in a given jurisdiction.  The main variable that would determine this minimum market 
jurisdiction taxable amount globally would be a measure of global operating margin, either 
overall or by business line.  A fixed return on sales would then be allocated to market 
jurisdictions in general. The fixed return percentage would vary based on operating 
margins.  The minimum market profit amount deemed allocable to market jurisdictions 
would be calculated by multiplying the fixed return percentage by revenues, and would 
then be apportioned among market jurisdictions on the basis of local revenues (sales).  
 
The return on sales percentage that determines the minimum market profit amount would 
increase or decrease for businesses or business lines with operating margins above and 
below an empirically determined average operating margin (the “Margin Adjustment 
Factor”).  When a business has very low, zero, or negative percent operating margins, the 
deemed minimum allocation to market jurisdictions would be zero.  Since the OM Method 
is not limited to residual returns, without a properly calibrated Margin Adjustment Factor, 
the market profit amount would disproportionately allocate profit to market jurisdictions 
for low margin businesses.   
 
To avoid double taxation in the OM Method, it might be necessary to specify the “surrender 
jurisdiction” that would give up the right to tax the market profit amount.  However, if tax 
due under otherwise applicable principles by MNC affiliates with traditional tax nexus to 
the market jurisdictions would be creditable against tax due on the “market profit amount” 
that is apportioned to any particular market jurisdiction, self-help to avoid double taxation 
would be available to MNCs.  Therefore, at least outside the loss case, the double taxation 
concern might be reduced. MNCs would be encouraged to structure transfer pricing 
arrangements so as to ensure a taxable income amount arose in entities with traditional 
nexus to the relevant market jurisdictions that was at least equal to the market profit amount 
allocated to the relevant jurisdiction. 41   
                                               
40 Consultation Document, supra note 4, at ¶54.  
41 Absent a clear international agreement that specified the surrender jurisdiction under the OM Method, 
market jurisdictions would likely conclude that in a regime with a clear “alternative minimum tax” structure, 
a non-favorable rule for deemed liability due to the market profit amount allocation that was not reflected in 
reported local income, would aid with enforcement. In other words, market jurisdictions might conclude that 
MNCs that did not reach the minimum taxable income amount in their jurisdiction would be deemed to have 
such additional income in the jurisdiction, without specifying in domestic (or treaty) law from which entity 
in the consolidated group the amount was “removed”.  For entities that did not book enough income in the 
relevant jurisdictions, the tax associated with the remaining minimum taxable income amount would 
explicitly be denominated as a non-deductible “market access fee.”   A non-favorable rule for deemed liability 
that was not reflected in reported local income would encourage MNCs to structure tax nexus and transfer 
pricing arrangements so as to ensure the minimum taxable income amount arose under otherwise applicable 
principles in the relevant market jurisdictions.  This non-favorable rule for the source of income creating the 
deemed liability that was not reflected in reported local income would encourage MNCs to structure tax 
nexus and transfer pricing arrangements so as to ensure the minimum taxable income amount arose under 
otherwise applicable principles in the relevant market jurisdictions.  Of course, annual sales and operating 
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Key Technical Differences between the CE Method and the OM Method 
 
The CE Method and the OM Method differ along six key structural dimensions.    
 
1.  Whether or not to attempt to impose a distinction between routine returns and non-
routine returns in defining the new taxing right allocated to market jurisdictions 
2. Whether or not to attempt to impose a distinction between returns associated with 
market intangibles and other returns in defining the new taxing right allocated to 
market jurisdictions 
3. Whether or not to include traditional transfer pricing concepts as a component of 
the system for defining the new taxing right allocated to market jurisdictions.   
4. Whether or not to rely on a consolidated tax base (unitary) calculations to define 
the new taxing right allocated to market jurisdictions  
5. Whether or not to use a minimum tax architecture to implement the new taxing 
right allocated to market jurisdictions 
6. Whether and how to use financial reporting concepts in defining the new taxing 
right allocated to market jurisdictions. 
 
The CE Method and the OM Method each reflect a series of structural choices that together 
create a methodology for a significant but not total reallocation of taxing rights to market 
jurisdictions. Again, features of the CE Method described above could be ported into an 
OM Method structure, and features of the OM Method could be ported into a CE Method 
structure.  Nothing precludes either proposal from incorporating features of the other.  The 
purpose of laying out two strawmen is simply to highlight structural choices that can affect 
the stability of any agreed system.   
 
Both the CE Method and the OM Method would create a “market profit amount” that 
governments might choose to describe as being “deemed attributable to market 
intangibles.”  However, in the case of the OM Method this deemed return is simply a 
percentage of revenues determined on an overall or business line basis. Any purported link 
to some idea of market intangibles is tenuous.  Determining the “market profit amount” 
based on only revenues and operating margins simultaneously simplifies the relevant 
calculation and distances it from the conceptual motivation for the market intangibles 
concept.   
 
In contrast, the CE Method is structured to claim a more meaningful relationship between 
the conceptual motivation for the market intangibles concept and the technical 
methodology used to determine the new taxing right.  Accordingly, in the CE Method 
includes a substantively attempt to separate routine returns from non-routine returns, and 
to measures the amount of investment in “market intangibles” and “other intangibles” in 
order to separate non-routine returns attributable to market intangibles from other non-
                                               
margins are only known definitively by MNCs at the end of the year.  In contrast, transfer pricing 
arrangements are usually set years in advance.  Thus, this structure incentivizes over-allocating profits to 
market jurisdictions.  The resulting pressure to respect transfer pricing so as to avoid double taxation thus 
would fall on residence jurisdictions rather than market jurisdictions. 
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routine returns. The CE Method uses a variant of a residual profit split transfer pricing 
approach to measure the relevant amounts. Using a substantive measurement system that 
attempts to capture a return attributable to market intangibles provides the justification for 
treating the new taxing right in the CE Method as a final taxing right.  In contrast, the OM 
Method is conceived of as having an alternative minimum tax structure.  ( 
 
The allocation mechanism included in the basic OM Method does not include a substantive 
structural feature intended to distinguish between non-routine profit attributable to a 
“market intangible,” as opposed to any other intangible, nor is it limited to “non-routine” 
or “residual” profits.  These design differences have two further important technical 
consequences.  First, the OM Method would not require calculating the amount of 
expenditures made to support either marketing or trade (production) intangibles.  Second, 
the OM Method would not necessarily require a unitary tax calculation (as traditionally 
conceived).  
 
Nevertheless, the OM Method does require unitary calculations in a more limited sense.  In 
particular, the OM Method requires a determination of the consolidated group’s operating 
margins. 42  Notably, this form of unitary measurement is generally familiar from financial 
and managerial accounting systems currently used for non-tax purposes.  If operating 
margins were determined on a groupwide global basis in accordance with the group’s 
financial statements then (at least for publicly traded companies) the definition of the inputs 
to determine the operating margin could (perhaps) be fully “outsourced” to financial 
accountants.  In other words, the operating margin could be determined using financial 
accounting measurements of revenue and earnings before interest and taxes, and without 
any independently defined tax accounting rules.43  Thus, in its simplest form, the OM 
Method largely dispenses with the problems associated with unitary taxation, even as it 
retains a unitary feature. 
 
On the other hand, if requirements to calculate revenues and/or operating margins on a 
business unit or jurisdictional basis were added to the OM Method, then required public 
financial reporting likely becomes inadequate.  Business line by business line operating 
margins are not required items of reporting under any existing financial reporting rules.  
Therefore, if business unit or jurisdictional basis calculations are added to the OM Method, 
unitary calculations being undertaken solely for tax purposes are reintroduced into the OM 
Method.  The same is true of any other “adjustment factors” added to the basic result 
                                               
42 Like the CE Method the OM Method would also require a determination of destination of sales or services 
under an agreed set of rules in order to allocate the minimum taxable income amount as among market 
jurisdictions.   
43 For this purpose I assume the OM Method would accept financial statements prepared in accordance with 
the generally accepted accounting principles prevailing a given MNC encounters in their ultimate parent 
entity’s country of residence.  Assuming proper application of generally accepted accounting principles raises 
various issues, not least with respect to accounting statements available for privately held corporations, or 
with respect to business conducted in passthrough form.  However, this paper is not intended to be an analysis 
of administrative concerns with any given proposal.  It simply asks what it would take to stabilize a particular 
method to implement market intangibles in the international tax system.  As a result, I do not delve fully into 
these questions. 
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reached by the OM Method.  Adjustment factors generally require unitary tax-driven 
reporting, and therefore a need for more extensive multilateral coordination on 
methodology.44  Financial reporting rules may still be relevant but would no longer be able 
to provide all the inputs required to reach a final result.   
 
III.  Stabilizing the Hypothetical Profit Reallocation Methods 
 
There are two first order concerns regarding the stability of the potential regimes described 
in Part II.   The first concern is that countries will defect from the hypothetically agreed-
upon system and impose alternative unilateral rules.  The second concern is that countries 
will disagree on the definitions of agreed-upon concepts or rules to such a degree as to 
create systemic incoherence.   
 
Part III first considers whether any of the mechanisms for stabilizing international tax 
agreements described in Part I could stabilize the strawman proposals described in Part II.   
In my usage, “stabilizing” means alleviating the two first order concerns described above.  
Those questions are:  
1) which decisions along the six key structural dimensions make stabilizing any 
of the Pillar One proposals easier or harder? 
2) which open questions must be answered to determine what decisions along the 
six key dimensions are viable from a stability perspective? 
 
Subpart A concludes that neither the CE Method or OM Method can realistically be 
stabilized using the G20 Soft Law Approach alone. Subpart B further concludes that neither 
strawman could be fully stabilized through the MLI Approach in the present environment, 
in which international tax has been highly politicized.  However, I also conclude that the 
concerns with using the MLI Approach to stabilize the CE Method are more fundamental 
than the concerns with using the MLI Approach to stabilize the OM Method. Moreover, 
with respect to stabilizing the OM Method, a narrow set of design choices may make the 
concerns possible to overcome.  Subpart C concludes that either the CE Method or the OM 
Method could be instantiated into international tax policy via the Multilateral Treaty 
Approach.  However, even under the Multilateral Treaty Approach, whether any agreement 
could be stabilized depends on the design decisions that are taken.  Certain design decisions 
are simply not possible to stabilize.  Subpart D concludes by reflecting on what the 
strawmen teach us about the six key structural dimensions.   
 
A. Stabilizing Profit Reallocation using G20 Soft Law Approach 
 
                                               
44 The submission by Johnson & Johnson to the OECD public consultation helps highlight some of these 
issues.  Johnson & Johnson, Comments on Public Consultation Document: Addressing the Tax Challenges 
of the Digitalization of the Economy (Mar. 3, 2019) [hereinafter Johnson & Johnson Consultation 
Document], available at https://www.dropbox.com/s/hou6dvuckmahoft/OECD-Comments-Received-
Digital-March-2019.zip?dl=0&file_subpath=%2FJohnson%26Johnson.pdf.  The J&J submission suggested, 
inter alia, country-level marketing spend as an “adjustment factor” to any profit reallocation approach.  Id.  
Any adjustment to the return on a sales-based minimum taxable income amount that turned on country-level 
marketing spend would need to determine country-directed marketing spend on a unitary and consistently 
agreed basis to avoid both manipulation and juridical double taxation.   
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1) Substantive Allocation Rules at the Level of Law 
 
With enough international coordination, a G20 Soft Law Approach backed by coercive 
threats could conceivably prevent outright defection from the two strawmen.  However, 
the developments that would be necessary are difficult to imagine, let alone implement. 
 
At the G20’s direction, it is possible to imagine the Inclusive Framework creating a peer 
review body that would develop a “terms of reference” and a “methodology” for 
determining whether countries were meeting their commitment to adopt a given Pillar One 
result as the new profit allocation norm within their domestic law.45  The terms of reference 
and methodology could be used to monitor and assess compliance with a Pillar One result 
through reports on what countries have done to implement an agreed approach. Those 
reports would be developed through a peer review process akin to those used in the Global 
Forum with respect to information exchange and at the Inclusive Framework to assess 
compliance with BEPS Action 5.  Moreover, the Inclusive Framework could also provide 
technical assistance and other enabling mechanisms to help jurisdictions seeking support 
in implementing the Pillar One result into their law. 
 
Importantly, the terms of reference development process undertaken by the “standard-
setter” that motivates the monitoring and other components of the G20 Soft Law Approach, 
has natural limits.  Developing terms of reference requires a significant level of political 
engagement.  Moreover, once terms of reference for peer review are agreed upon, 
methodologies that implement those terms of reference rarely reach a further level of detail 
that is sensitive (except when the sensitivity is limited to one or two jurisdictions).  
Therefore, peer review is substantially more difficult to implement successfully in an area 
where the details of a standard are likely to evolve rapidly. 
 
For the sake of argument, one could imagine that over a few years, an international soft 
law meta-architecture, involving a standard-setter, a monitoring mechanism, enablers, and, 
importantly, enforcement threats, could be established to attempt to prevent outright 
defection from a given Pillar One result.  G20 Soft Law Approach mechanisms backed by 
coercive threats from a few governments have been successful in the past.  Successes even 
include occasional instances where the consequences of such success were redistributive 
as among major sovereigns.46   
                                               
45 Cf. OECD, Terms of Reference: To Monitor and Review Progress towards Transparency and Exchange of 
Information for Tax Purposes, OECD (2010), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/42/44824681.pdf (describing in detail international standards for 
information exchange upon request in tax matters); Global Forum on Transparency & Exch. Of Info. For Tax 
Purposes, OECD, Revised Methodology for Peer Reviews and Non-Members Reviews (2011), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/44824721.pdf (detailing how to conduct reviews).   
46 One major lesson from the history of the utilization of the G20 Soft Law Approach over various fields of 
international economic law, is that even where preferences among the larger economies are aligned, some 
enforcement mechanism is usually needed to implement high-level political agreements reached under the 
auspices of the G20 Soft Law Approach.  When the relevant agreements have a distributive character and 
impose a net cost on one or more of the largest economies, an even higher premium exists on meaningful 
defensive measures to deter non-compliance. 
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For example, the Basel I Accord47 on capital adequacy for financial institutions was, in an 
important sense, redistributive.  During the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, the 
U.S. and UK felt compelled to bail out Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico in order to indirectly 
rescue their own banks—which had loaned heavily to these countries—from the potential 
consequences of sovereign debt defaults.48  Regulators in both countries then came under 
pressure to raise capital adequacy standards for domestic banks in order to limit the 
opportunity for banking concerns to socialize the cost of bad loans again at a future date.49  
The Basel I Accord effectively shifted part of the potential cost of these increased capital 
adequacy requirements (reduced competitiveness of U.S. and UK banking concerns 
internationally) onto the Japanese, French, German, and Swiss banks that were then the 
primary competitors of U.S. and UK financial institutions. The adoption of the Basel I 
Accord and its implementation worldwide, over the resistance of those other countries, was 
a function of relative power and coercive threats.50  At the time, the dominance of US and 
UK financial markets was such that by threatening to exclude non-compliant foreign banks 
from their markets, the US and the UK were able to force implementation and overcome 
countervailing interests.51 
 
As in Basel I, distributional considerations are central to the debate over reallocating MNC 
profits. In the international tax debate, different proposed solutions can encourage different 
allocations of revenue, business activity, or both as among large economies.  Competitive 
dynamics are often at play; national interests either diverge or appear to diverge. In this 
type of distributive setting, peer review without a significant sanction for being found non-
compliant by other member peer states simply would not be efficacious.   
 
Rather, for the peer review to have meaningful effect, failure to be deemed compliant 
would have to create a license for jurisdictions to implement defensive measures. The exact 
details of those defensive measures are not important for this analysis, but to work they 
would need to be harsh, and they would need to be implemented.   
 
If such defensive measures were agreed, every country in the world would not need to in 
fact impose them for the defensive measures to have global effect.  For instance, if just any 
two of the United States, the European Union, and China were to agree that being found 
non-compliant with a peer review would trigger specified harsh defensive measures, that 
would probably be enough. After all, together those jurisdictions represent such a large 
share of the global marketplace 
 
                                               
47 The Basel Accords (Basel I, Basel II, and Basel III) set out international standards for how much capital 
banks need to hold to safeguard their solvency against the financial and operational risks they face. See 
Verdier, supra note 45, at 1466-67.; Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and their 
Limits, 34 Yale J. Int’l L. 113, 132 (2009) [hereinafter Verdier II]. 
48 See, e.g., Wolfgang H. Reinicke, BANKING, POLITICS AND GLOBAL FINANCE: AMERICAN COMMERCIAL 
BANKS AND REGULATORY CHANGE, 1980–1990, 142 (1995). 
49 David Andrew Singer, REGULATING CAPITAL: SETTING STANDARDS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM 9 (2007). 
50 Verdier II, supra note 49, at 136.  
51 Id.  
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However, the political realities of the current international tax debate regarding market 
intangibles do not suggest the kind of potential for coercive coordination that arose in the 
runup to Basel I.  Coercive coordination among any two of the United States, the European 
Union (acting collectively), and China will be difficult.  Major states within the European 
Union have expressed concerns at the most senior levels regarding market intangibles (for 
example, Chancellor Merkel has publicly expressed concerns on behalf of Germany).  
Meanwhile, although one could imagine the United States and China agreeing on a market 
intangibles Pillar One approach, the more general economic diplomacy relationship 
between the United States and China is at a historic post-Nixon low. In this climate, a 
decision to set aside other concerns and cooperate very closely and bilaterally to coerce the 
world towards a market intangibles profit reallocation seems unlikely.   
 
2) Preventing “Mock Compliance” with Substantive Allocation Rules 
 
Assessing the adequacy of a country’s enforcement of multilaterally agreed substantive tax 
principles is a much more difficult and fraught task for peer review than determining 
whether implementing legislation is in place.  Even if countries agreed in form on a given 
Pillar One approach, it would be almost impossible to ensure consistent enforcement using 
traditional G20 Soft Law tools.  Moreover, peer review mechanisms lack any capacity to 
address specific cases and controversies, or even to determine whether at some general 
level the preponderance of cases and controversies are appropriately resolved.  Put more 
simply, when it comes to taxpayer dispute resolution, peer review has little if any role.  
More generally, the G20 Soft Law Approach is broadly known to be susceptible to mock 
compliance.  In regimes involving G20 Soft Law enforcement, mock compliance can be 
achieved by jurisdictions that wish to defect by combining formalistic implementation with 
alternative relief for regulated actors, systematic regulatory forbearance, and/or informal, 
administrative non-enforcement.52 
 
B. Stabilizing Profit Reallocation using MLI+ Approach 
 
Attempting to stabilize a given Pillar One result through the MLI+ Approach likely 
involves using eight related sub-mechanisms: (a) modifying Article 9 of the OECD Model 
Treaty; (b) modifying Article 5 of the OECD Model Treaty; (c) modifying Article 7 of the 
OECD Model Treaty; (d) modifying the OECD’s TPG; (e) providing for mandatory 
binding arbitration with respect to the application of the new rules; (f) implementing the 
requisite treaty changes through the MLI itself; (g) amending the Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters to automatically exchange information to 
administer the system; and (h) revising country-by-country reporting (“CBCR”) rules.  
These eight mechanisms represent the complete panoply of relevant tools the OECD’s 
CTPA has used in the past to accomplish various international tax objectives.  Subpart B.1) 
introduces each of the eight aforementioned sub-mechanisms.  Those readers who are 
familiar with these eight mechanisms can skip subpart B.1).  Subparts B.2) and B.3) ask 
whether the combination of all eight sub-mechanisms could successfully stabilize the CE 
Method or the OM Method.   
                                               
52  Cf. Andrew Walter, GOVERNING FINANCE:  EAST ASIA’S ADOPTION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
(2008); Grinberg, supra note 9. 
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1) Background on the Components of the MLI+ Approach 
 
a) Article 9 of the OECD Model Convention 
 
Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty is the source of the authoritative basic statement of 
the “arm’s length” principle of international transfer pricing.53  Language identical or 
nearly identical to Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty appears in thousands of bilateral 
tax treaties. 
 
The arm’s length standard is designed to prevent MNCs from using transfer pricing to 
create tax advantages for themselves because they operate in group form rather than 
conducting business as independent enterprises transacting with one another across borders 
and as a result, can dictate the pricing of inter-firm cross-border transactions.54  For more 
than thirty years, the arm’s length principle represented a consensual solution to the 
problem of allocating tax between different parts of an MNC, but now the principle is 
heavily criticized.55 
 
The key feature of the arm’s length standard inscribed in Article 9 is that it seeks to adjust 
profits by reference to comparable uncontrolled transactions conducted by independent 
enterprises.  Article 9 therefore provides for a fundamentally transactional approach driven 
by “comparability analysis.”   
 
The market intangibles concept is not transactional in the same sense and would apply 
without reference to third party comparability analysis.  Thus, modifying Article 9 to 
incorporate a market intangibles concept would involve a substantial transformation of the 
provision and an overlay of a concept that is unrelated to the basis of current Article 9.   
 
b)  Article 5 of the OECD Model Convention  
                                               
53 Article 9 provides that “[where] conditions are made or imposed between the two [associated] enterprises 
in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made between independent 
enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, 
but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and 
taxed accordingly.” OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 2017, 
Article 9 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1787/mtc_cond-2017-en. 
54 See e.g. OECD, Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation, Actions 8-10, OECD/G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (2015), https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241244-en.  The arm’s length 
principle requires that transactions between associated enterprises be priced as if the enterprises were 
independent, such that the pricing reflects what third parties operating at arm’s length would agree with one 
another.   
55  John Neighbour, Transfer pricing, Keeping it at arm’s length, OECD Observer (Apr. 21, 2002), 
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/670/Transfer_pricing:_Keeping_it_at_arms_length
.html.  Of course, important academic critiques and alternative proposals existed before the onset of the BEPS 
project.  E.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah, Splitting the Unsplittable: Toward a Formulary Approach to Allocating 
Residuals Under Profit Split, Univ. of Michigan Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, No. 
378, Working Paper (2013) (proposing that the OECD use formulary apportionment to allocate residual profit 
of the “profit split method”). 
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Article 5 of the OECD Model Convention presents the conventional standard for when an 
enterprise based in one state has a sufficient connection to another state to justify taxation 
by the latter state. Under Article 5 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, a sufficient 
connection exists when an enterprise resident in one state (the “residence state”) has a 
“permanent establishment” (“PE”) in another state (the “source state”). The PE threshold 
must be met before the source state may tax that enterprise on active business income 
properly attributable to the enterprise’s activity in the source state. The permanent 
establishment rule encapsulated in Article 5 thus represents the basic international standard 
governing jurisdiction to tax a non-resident enterprise.  
A market intangibles concept requires creating nexus to tax in circumstances where only 
sales tie an enterprise to a jurisdiction, and thus would require changes to Article 5 of the 
OECD Model Convention (which might include creating an additional nexus rule that was 
separate from but coordinated with the remainder of Article 5). 56    
c)  Article 7 of the OECD Model Convention  
 
Under  the most recent version of Article 7 of the OECD’s Model Tax Convention, profits 
attributable to a PE are those that the PE would have derived if it were a separate and 
independent enterprise performing the activities which cause it to be a PE.19 
Fundamentally, this rule was developed by tax treaty experts because they all recognized 
that if associated enterprises in different countries were taxed under the Article 9 arm’s 
length standard, but PEs were taxed under some other rule under Article 7, distortions 
between structures involving PEs and structures involving subsidiaries would arise.   
 
As a result, in 2010 the OECD Model Tax Convention was revised to incorporate rules that 
attempt to apply the Transfer Pricing Guidelines (“TPG”) and the arm’s length principle as 
consistently as possible to subsidiaries and PEs.57   At that time, the OECD issued a report 
on the attribution of profits to permanent establishments. The report concluded that a PE 
should be treated as if it were distinct and separate from its overseas head office, and that 
assets and risks should be attributed to the PE or the head office in line with the location 
of “significant people functions.” Thus, under the Authorized OECD Approach (“AOA”) 
the attribution of profits to a PE is meant to be determined via an analysis of the amount of 
revenue and expense that the PE would have recognized if it were a separate and 
independent enterprise.  
                                               
56 In addition to taxing rights under Article 7 discussed below, the existence of a PE also creates various 
special source country taxing rights under articles of the OECD Model Convention related to the distribution 
of dividends (Article 10), the payment of interest and royalties (Articles 11 and 12), and the realization of 
capital gains (Article 13).  Market intangibles-driven alterations to the PE rules would have to address the 
interaction of new nexus rules with these references to Article 5.    
57 See Commentary to Article 7, para 2 of the OECD Model Treaty, para 16 (“the basic approach incorporated 
in the paragraph for the purposes of determining what are the profits that are attributable to the permanent 
establishment is therefore to require the determination of the profits under the fiction that the permanent 
establishment is a separate enterprise and that such an enterprise is independent from the rest of the enterprise 
of which it is a part as well as from any other person… that faction corresponds to the arm’s length principle 
which is also applicable, under the provisions of Article 9, for purposes of adjusting the profits of associated 
enterprises.”) 
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The post-2010 OECD approach to attributing profits to a PE is commonly referred to as 
the “AOA”.20  This approach is incorporated into soft law in the 2010 version of the 
business profits article (Article 7) of the OECD Model Tax Convention.  Under those rules, 
which are meant to produce a result as similar to the Article 9 arm’s length result as 
possible, step one of the AOA leads to the recognition of internal dealings between the PE 
and its head office. 21 Under step two, the guidance in the OECD TPG is applied by analogy 
to determine the arm’s length pricing of the internal dealing between the PE and the head 
office.22.    
 
However, the AOA has not been included in most existing bilateral tax treaties.  As the 
OECD observed just last year: 
 
“[M]any tax treaties contain a version of Article 7 that does not require the 
use of the AOA. In cases governed by those treaties, the method of 
attributing profits to a PE for the purpose of Article 7 of the applicable treaty 
might differ significantly from the AOA. This might be a function of the 
interrelation between the treaty and the domestic law of the jurisdiction 
where the PE is located (e.g., if the treaty expressly permitted the use of a 
customary domestic law apportionment approach, and domestic law 
contained such an approach). In other cases, the treaty might expressly 
prohibit the recognition of notional dealings between the PE and the non-
resident enterprise of which it is a part (e.g., treaties with a version of Article 
7 based on the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries).”   
 
Notably, the BEPS MLI did not include a provision that encouraged jurisdictions to adopt 
the AOA.  In contrast, certain other provisions that were not explicitly part of the BEPS 
project but that would help with consistent application of BEPS recommendations, were 
included in the MLI to aid in improving tax treaty conformity around the world.  Given 
that broader adoption of the AOA would certainly have helped improve consistent 
implementation of the Article 5 results approved in BEPS, a logical conclusion to draw is 
that AOA language was not included the MLI because its inclusion was or would have 
been too controversial or generated too much opposition from participating states.   
 
Commentary on additional guidance issued by the OECD in 2018 on the attribution of 
profits to PEs suggests that the OECD may have abandoned or failed in the effort to get 
jurisdictions to agree to consistent, standardized rules of application of the AOA.58 For 
instance, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Tax Affairs Robert 
Stack concluded that by not “affirmatively reaching consensus that the Article 9 analysis 
precedes the Article 7 analysis (or vice versa),” and by not “harmonizing the significant 
people functions analysis under Article 7 with the risk control framework under Article 9, 
                                               
58 Id. at 3.  
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the 2018 guidance leaves unresolved the fundamental issues that WP6 set out to address 
post-BEPS.”59 
 
Separately, the OECD has recognized that permanent establishments that are created other 
than by a physical presence (such as an office or the like) in a host jurisdiction pose special 
administrative challenges, both within and without the AOA.60  The basic problem is that 
local businesses with a physical presence tend to establish independent financial 
accounting records at least for managerial purposes; these accounting records provide a 
starting point for the attribution of profit for tax purposes.  In contrast, when a PE is simply 
deemed to exist in a given jurisdiction for tax purposes but without being tied to any 
physical presence of the enterprise in that jurisdiction, the corporation generally will not 
have established any separate managerial records with respect to business deemed to be 
attributable to the jurisdiction in question.  As a result, in these cases the attribution of 
profits to the market jurisdiction must be “invented” from scratch (entirely via tax rules 
that attribute profits to the jurisdiction, rather than by beginning from some non-tax 
foundation).  
 
d) OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
 
The OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines are dedicated to providing guidance on applying 
the arm’s length standard enshrined in Article 9 of the OECD Model.61  Hundreds of pages 
of text in the OECD TPG are dedicated to this endeavor.  Among other things, the OECD 
TPG repeatedly explains that it is inappropriate for either MNCs or tax administrations to 
deviate from the application of the arm’s length standard.  Thus, the OECD TPG is an 
awkward vehicle for inscribing changes to profit allocation that go beyond the arm’s length 
principle, and into the international tax architecture. 
 
Nevertheless, small portions of the OECD TPG in recent years began to include discussions 
of non-traditional transfer pricing methodologies that are then deemed “arm’s length.”  The 
discussions in Chapter IV of the OECD TPG regarding safe harbors and advance pricing 
agreements are examples.  Similarly, the model competent authority agreement now 
included in Annex I to Chapter IV of the OECD TPG contemplates a formulary markup 
that governments bilaterally or multilaterally could agree would be “deemed to constitute 
an arm’s length level of compensation.”  In this limited sense, the OECD TPG already 
                                               
59 Deloitte, OECD releases additional guidance on attribution of profits to permanent establishments, ARM’S 
LENGTH STAND. 3 (June 2018), available at  
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dtt-tax-armslengthstandard-
180611.pdf. 
60 OECD, Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, OECD/CTPA 63 ¶247 (July 22, 
2010) [hereinafter Report on Attribution of Profits], available at https://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-
pricing/45689524.pdf. 
61 For example, all of Chapter I of the TPG is devoted to identifying the commercial or financial relations 
between associated enterprises and accurately delineating the controlled transactions for purposes of applying 
the arm’s length principle.  Chapters II and III of the TPG are devoted to methods for comparing the 
conditions and the economically relevant circumstances of controlled transactions with comparable 
transactions between independent enterprises.  OECD TPG, supra note 35, chs I-III. 
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imagines redefining the meaning of the “arm’s length standard,” and thereby modifying 
the application of Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty without changing the words in the 
model treaty and tax treaties based thereon.   
 
Although the OECD TPG represents an extended interpretation of the arm’s length 
standard, it is outside the OECD Model Commentary because of its length, detail, and an 
unwillingness by at least some jurisdictions to give the same weight to the OECD TPG that 
they give to the OECD Model Commentary.  Indeed, the physical separation of the 
guidelines from the Commentary has led courts and tax administrations in various 
jurisdictions to think of the OECD TPG as a distinct soft law instrument with a different 
persuasive status than the Commentary.  Sovereigns around the world have adopted 
detailed domestic transfer pricing rules that address the OECD TPG in quite varied ways.62      
 
Any effort to bring a market intangibles concept into effect multilaterally would almost 
certainly require, as part of that effort, one or more new chapters of the OECD TPG 
explaining the relationship of this concept to the prior arm’s length standard, as well as a 
substantial rewrite of the existing parts of the OECD TPG.  The work would be essential, 
since countries would need guidance on how to implement market intangibles.  Moreover, 
some countries incorporate the OECD TPG directly into their domestic law by cross-
reference.  For such countries, without changes to the TPG their law would not change.   
 
e) Arbitration under bilateral tax treaties (Article 25(5)) 
 
Article 25 of the OECD Model Treaty generally provides a mechanism for tax 
administrations to resolve disputes among themselves as to the application of a bilateral 
tax treaty.  The BEPS project accomplished relatively little to make this dispute resolution 
mechanism, known as the “Mutual Agreement Procedure” (“MAP”), more effective. 
 
Most of Article 25 is devoted to facilitating elective dispute resolution mechanisms that 
can solve disputes when both competent authorities (the tax administrations of the two 
countries that are party to the bilateral tax treaty) agree on how to resolve the situation of 
a particular taxpayer, or a more general administrative issue related to the interpretation or 
application of the tax treaty.  As the world’s most well-known tax treaty treatise explains, 
the difficulty with Article 25 paragraphs 1 through 4 is that “[t]he taxpayer has a weak 
position in the proceedings, the proceedings may take too long to complete, there is no 
guarantee that a mutual agreement will be implemented, and lastly there is no guarantee 
that a mutual agreement will be reached in the first place.”63  
 
                                               
62 For example, the Nigerian Income Tax Regulations specify that they are to be “applied in a manner 
consistent with” the OECD TPG “as supplemented and updated from time to time.”  Income Tax (Transfer 
Pricing) Regulation No. (1) (2016), § 11 (Nigeria).  See also Tanzania Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) 
Regulations (2014), § 9 (same).  In contrast, for countries like the United States, Brazil, India, and China, the 
domestic transfer pricing guidance process involves evaluating changes to the OECD TPG at the 
administrative level and determining whether or not to incorporate those changes into domestic law and 
regulations. 
63 Johannes Becker, Ekkehart Reimer and Alexander Rust, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions ¶ 
104, at 1810 (2015). 
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In contrast, paragraph 5 of Article 25 provides a mechanism for binding arbitration of 
double taxation disputes that the relevant tax authorities have been unable to resolve among 
themselves. The binding dispute resolution mechanism of paragraph 5 provides for an 
independent decision on the unresolved issue. Importantly, after two years a taxpayer can 
submit an unresolved dispute that concerns that taxpayer to arbitration, without regard to 
whether one or both of the competent authorities would prefer for the arbitration not to 
occur.   
 
The mechanism provided by Article 25(5) is last best offer arbitration (colloquially known 
in the US as “baseball arbitration”).  Thus, in the mandatory binding arbitration system in 
place in those tax treaties that include Article 25(5), each of the two tax administrations 
that are treated as the “parties” to the dispute disclose a proposed settlement to the dispute.  
The taxpayer in some instances is also allowed to make a submission.  The independent 
arbitration panel’s task is then to pick one of the two proposals made by the two tax 
administrations, without giving any reasoning for the arbitral panel’s decision.  This 
mechanism for arbitrating tax disputes is favored by most governments that support 
mandatory binding arbitration because it resolves disputes without creating any supra-
national body of international tax law. 
 
Although Article 25(5) is part of the OECD Model Treaty, it is unusual as compared to 
other provisions of the treaty in the sense that the provision (or any version thereof) appears 
in only a small minority of actual bilateral tax treaties as between OECD member states.  
In the BEPS project, the United States advocated for Article 25(5) mandatory binding 
arbitration to be a minimum standard, but nothing of that sort was agreed.  Twenty 
countries (including the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, and several European 
countries) did declare their commitment to provide for mandatory binding arbitration in 
their bilateral tax treaties as a corollary to the increased controversy that could be 
engendered by BEPS measures.  However, the majority of the world’s economy did not 
make this declaration, nor did any emerging or developing economy endorse mandatory 
binding arbitration.   
 
f) The multilateral instrument (“MLI”) 
 
The MLI is a legal instrument that was developed during the BEPS project to modify 
existing bilateral tax treaties through a subsequent multilateral treaty.64  Historically, the 
sheer number of bilateral tax treaties (3800+) hampered the effectiveness of multilateral 
efforts to amend the treaty network, because individually negotiated bilateral updates to 
the treaty network were burdensome and time-consuming for governments.65  In November 
2016, over 100 jurisdictions concluded negotiations on the MLI.  Eighty-seven 
                                               
64 See also Note by OECD Directorate for Legal Affairs on the MLI: Functioning under Public International 
Law (Oct. 1, 2015), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/legal-note-on-the-functioning-of-the-MLI-
under-public-international-law.pdf. 
65  Cf. Explanatory Statement to the Multilateral Convention to Implement Treaty Related Measures to 
Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD at ¶4 (Nov. 24, 2016), 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/explanatory-statement-multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-treaty-
related-measures-to-prevent-BEPS.pdf. 
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jurisdictions have now signed the treaty, producing changes to more than 1500 bilateral tax 
treaties.66  The MLI is a flexible instrument that was originally used to swiftly implement 
changes to tax treaties agreed to in the BEPS project across the treaty network of 
participating jurisdictions.  However, the OECD clearly contemplates the MLI as one 
model for future implementation of tax treaty standards agreed to at the OECD. 67  
Moreover, Article 33 of the MLI provides a mechanism for amending the instrument, and 
Article 31 in effect allows any majority of jurisdictions that are parties to the MLI to 
proceed with an amendment to the MLI that would have effect as among the bilateral 
treaties of the electing group of states.  Changes to OECD Model Treaty articles intended 
to stabilize any agreed market intangibles concept would almost certainly be put forth by 
the OECD as amendments to the MLI under Article 33 thereof. 
 
g) The Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters 
. 
As amended in 2010, the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters (the “Administrative Assistance Convention)” provides a mechanism for 
multilateral automatic information exchange through provisions intended to facilitate such 
exchange. 68  The Administrative Assistance Convention is a full-fledged legal vehicle for 
automatic information exchange for tax purposes as among signatories, while requiring 
countries to protect taxpayer information from misuse and respect taxpayer rights.69 The 
Administrative Assistance Convention as amended in 2010, allows competent authorities 
to reach further competent authority agreements in order to establish automatic information 
exchange with respect to any category of foreseeably relevant information.70  Two such 
agreements, one of which covers country-by-country reporting (CBCR), have already been 
reached.71   
The Administrative Assistance Convention also includes a provision that allows for 
collection assistance.  That provision is one of the only articles of the convention on which 
reservations by signatories are permitted.72  
                                               
66 See MLI Database – Matrix of options and reservations, OECD, for status of ratification available at 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/mli-database-matrix-options-and-reservations.htm.  
67  See Frequently Asked Questions on the Multilateral Instrument (MLI), OECD at ¶17 (July 2017), 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/MLI-frequently-asked-questions.pdf. 
68 Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters [hereinafter Administrative Assistance 
Convention], available at https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115606-en. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at art. 6.  
71  See Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on Automatic Exchange of Financial Account 
Information, available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/multilateral-competent-
authority-agreement.pdf  (implementing the Common Reporting Standard, which is the OECD’s FATCA-
based standard for the automatic exchange of financial account information with respect to offshore 
accounts); CRS Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement, available at 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/international-framework-for-the-crs/multilateral-competent-
authority-agreement.pdf. Each of these agreements have over a hundred signatory jurisdictions. 
72Administrative Assistance Convention, supra note 71 at art. 11. 
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 Finally, the Administrative Assistance Convention includes features that provide 
the legal basis for the establishment of a standard-setting body. The Convention has a 
“coordinating body” with legal authority to furnish opinions on questions regarding the 
application of the provisions of the convention, including those governing automatic 
information exchange.73.  Importantly, the membership of the coordinating body is limited 
to competent authorities of jurisdictions that have signed the Convention.  Thus, the “price” 
of being part of the potential standard-setting body established within the Convention, is 
to agree to a legally binding instrument that requires compliance with the terms that are 
set.   
As of May 2018, the Administrative Assistance Convention covered 128 
jurisdictions.74 Notably, the United States ratified the original convention (in 1991), and 
signed the 2010 amendment to the convention, but has not ratified the 2010 amendment.75  
As a practical matter, a country that has not ratified the 2010 amendment cannot effectively 
use the Convention as the legal basis for new forms of automatic information exchange, as 
organized through the competent authority agreement process created via the 
Convention.76   
h) Country by Country Reporting 
 
Under the CBCR rules agreed to in the BEPS project, large MNCs are required to file a 
Country-by-Country Report that reports annually to each tax jurisdiction in which the 
MNC does business, the amount of revenue, profit before income tax, and income tax paid 
and accrued in each jurisdiction around the world. CBCR also requires MNCs to report 
their number of employees, stated capital, retained earnings, and tangible assets in each tax 
jurisdiction. Finally, it requires MNCs to identify each entity within the group doing 
business in a particular tax jurisdiction and to provide an indication of the business 
activities that each entity undertakes. 77   All OECD and G20 countries committed to 
implementing CBCR, and almost all are now doing so. 
 
                                               
73 Id. at art. 24.; See Explanatory Report to the Convention as Amended by the Protocol, Protocol Amending 
the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, OECD ¶240 (May 27, 2010) [hereinafter 
Explanatory Report on Amended Administrative Assistance Convention], available at http://www.oecd. 
org/dataoecd/7/62/48091084.pdf.  The OECD is the secretariat for this coordinating body.  Id. at ¶238. 
74 Jurisdictions Participating in the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, OECD, 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/Status_of_convention.pdf (last visited May 29, 
2019).  
75 The 2010 amendment to the convention was primarily concerned with updating the information exchange 
standards to reflect the new more cooperative environment for international tax information exchange that 
emerged in the years immediately following the financial crisis.   
76 For example, without signing the protocol no country can use the convention in its administrative assistance 
relationship with countries that were not in the Council of Europe or the OECD in the 1990s. See also 
generally JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, Explanation of Proposed Protocol Amending the Multilateral 
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, JCX-9-14 (Feb. 21, 2014).  
77 OECD, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, Action 13 – 2015 Final 
Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (2015), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241480-en.  
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To date, CBCR is the most notable corporate tax example of a G20-convened information 
reporting standard.  Given how deeply objectionable CBCR reporting was for the private 
sector, and the high levels of disagreement in revising substantive transfer pricing guidance 
among governments, the ease with which CBCR was agreed upon between governments 
and is now being successfully implemented is quite striking. The key lesson, consistent 
with the scholarship on international financial law,78 is that in G20-convened processes, 
information reporting can often be agreed to even when the coordination of related 
substantive law proves too difficult.79   
 
When it comes to regulating MNCs, the information reporting context differs from the 
substantive law context in that global imposition of a standard can often be achieved 
without affirmatively coercing dissenting states, so long as the required reporting is clearly 
specified and agreed as soft law in a multilateral setting.  CBCR is in effect a G20 Soft 
Law rule that lacks a coercive measure agreed to at the international level in order to ensure 
compliance.  However, once CBCR was adopted at the OECD level, the basic reality was 
that any sovereign could require the local subsidiary of an MNC to report CBCR 
information on the activities of an entire multinational group.  Furthermore, after the BEPS 
project such a sovereign could point to international norms endorsing CBCR and providing 
a template for how the information should be reported to justify its reporting requirements 
and to suggest that the MNC would have developed systems to collect the relevant data, 
since it would need to report CBCR information to one country or another. Thus, non-
compliance by any individual sovereign (even a powerful sovereign like the United States) 
was not likely to be effective.   
 
As the United States Treasury Department and the IRS wrote in the preamble to their final 
regulations implementing CBCR “U.S. MNC groups will be subject to country-by-country 
(“CbC”) filing obligations in other countries in which they do business if the United States 
does not implement CbC reporting.”  The U.S. Treasury and the IRS went on to note that 
for this reason, not only would non-implementation be futile, but failure to adopt CbC 
reporting requirements in the United States may increase compliance costs because U.S. 
MNC groups may be subject to CbC filing obligations in multiple foreign tax jurisdictions. 
U.S. MNC groups might also be subject to varying CbC filing rules and requirements in 
different foreign tax jurisdictions, such as requirements to prepare the CbC report using the 
                                               
78 See generally Pierre-Hugues Verdier, The Political Economy of International Financial Regulation, 88 
Ind. L.J. 1405 (2013). 
79 G20 Soft Law Processes that create reporting standards have often been successful.  For example, the G20 
convened the soft law standard-setting process that the International Organization of Security Commissioners 
(“IOSCO”) undertook to reach their Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation 
and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information.  The IOSCO MMoU improved and standardized exchange 
of information cross-border for the purpose of regulatory enforcement regarding securities markets. 
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of 
Information (MMoU), INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, http://www.ww.iosco.org/ about/?subsection=mmou 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2015).  See generally. Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, 
International Relations, and Compliance, THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Walter Carlnaes, 
Thomas Risse & Beth Simmons, eds., 2002).  Similarly, the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard began in 
part as a G20 convened information reporting standard setting exercise.  It too has been quite successful.   
 
 [WORK-IN-PROGRESS; COMMENTS WELCOME] 
 29 
local currency or language.”80 As a result of the dynamic correctly described by the U.S. 
Treasury and IRS, every major MNC headquarters jurisdiction adopted CBCR rules.   
 
2) Stabilizing CE Method using MLI Approach 
 
In the CE Method, tax disputes would inevitably be multi-country income-based (rather 
than two-country transaction-based) disputes.  The main reason the disputes would be 
multi-country arises from two interacting features of the CE Method.  First, in the CE 
Method a residual return must be calculated on a unitary basis at the level of the 
consolidated group.  That unitary residual return is then split so as to allocate a portion 
thereof to market intangibles and apportion that amount to multiple jurisdictions.  Second, 
the determination of what constitutes a residual return as opposed to a routine return 
involves applying conventional bilateral transfer pricing concepts.  As a result, every 
jurisdiction in theory has an interest in what were conventionally purely bilateral disputes.  
Moreover, every jurisdiction has an interest in the fraction of the residual that any given 
jurisdiction claims should be apportioned to them, because the result may affect what is 
“left over” for all other jurisdictions to claim.  The destination fraction is relevant in all 
cases as a result of the final liability structure (as contrasted with a minimum tax structure) 
of the CE Method. 
 
Consider what would be required to embed the CE Method calculation in the tax treaties. 
First, Article 9 and the OECD transfer pricing guidelines would clearly need to be amended 
to include all specifications required to reach a consistent, unitary calculation of residual 
returns.  Otherwise it would not be possible to prevent double taxation, as intended by the 
tax treaties, because the residual return allocated to market intangibles would vary based 
on each country’s calculation of the size of that residual return.    
 
Article 5 would similarly need to be amended to revamp the PE standard so as to allow for 
some form of taxable nexus for the new taxing right in a case where the only connection 
between a taxpayer and a jurisdiction is a given level of sales (or “users”).  Presumably this 
change would be made (somehow) without changing the PE standard for other purposes.   
 
Article 7 and the AOA would then need to be revamped to parallel the changes that were 
made to Article 9 to allow for the CE Method. All jurisdictions would then need to adopt 
the new Article 7.  In the CE Method, consistent adoption of the revised profit attribution 
rules would be much more important than is consistent adoption of the AOA under current 
law.81  
 
Now consider whether amending only a subset of tax treaties could adequately implement 
the CE Method.  Even if Articles 5, 7, and 9 of the OECD Model Treaty and the OECD 
TPG were all modified to include a methodology for implementing the CE Method, actual 
                                               
80 Country-by-Country Reporting, 81 Fed. Reg. 42482 (June 30, 2016). 
81 Alternatively a new special nexus article with associated profit allocation rules that somehow stood 
independently from Articles 5, 7 and 9 and nevertheless integrated and interact with them would need to be 
added to the treaties.  As a first order matter this neither seems simpler nor to fundamentally affect the 
analysis.   
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implementation would remain inadequate.  If some countries or country pairs continued 
using the old arm’s length Article 9 standard, or the old Article 5 PE standard, and the prior 
AOA or other domestic approaches to attributing profits to PEs, while other countries 
reallocate some significant fraction of unitary income based on the CE Method, 
incoherence would almost inevitably result.   
 
Further consider whether the bilateral tax treaty system would resolve disputes in a CE 
Method even if all countries agreed in principle on a methodology for the unitary 
calculation underlying the CE Method. Assume (perhaps heroically) that the countries were 
able to reduce the CE Method agreement to language amenable to being incorporated into 
Articles 5, 7, and 9 of the OECD Model Treaty, all to be implemented in extant tax treaties 
through an amendment to the MLI that all IF jurisdictions signed. Would this suffice to 
successfully implement the CE Method?  The answer is:  no.    
 
The problem that arises with implementing the CE Method through an MLI Approach is 
related to all of the following: 1) the split between routine and non-routine returns; 2) the 
use of transfer pricing to determine the split between routine and non-routine returns, as 
well as the value of routine returns and non-routine returns associated with market 
intangibles; and 3) the unitary nature of the CE Method. 82  The unitary issue is the most 
central problem.  As a result of the unitary approach, when one jurisdiction has determined 
that it is owed more than is appropriate, either because it has claimed too much routine 
profit or because it has claimed too large a share of non-routine profit, it is not clear which 
of the other jurisdictions in which the MNC reports income, has been harmed.  
 
Said another way, in the CE Method, when one jurisdiction is due more tax revenue than 
the MNC pays that jurisdiction, it is deeply unclear which jurisdiction in the world should 
receive less tax base. If multiple countries take the position that they may claim more tax 
base than the MNC believes is properly allocable to those countries, a treaty system 
consisting exclusively of bilateral, state-to-state obligations, combined with a calculation 
of tax liability based on facts and circumstances bilateral transfer pricing and unitary 
measurements of residual taxable income, simply cannot effectively resolve the question 
of which tax administration should lose out when another tax administration either 
appropriately or inappropriately claims revenue.    
 
Another way to see the issue is to consider whether “last best offer” arbitration (of the type 
that appears in Article 25(5)) could resolve disputes that would arise in a CE Method 
system.  Last best offer arbitration by definition only works in disputes between two 
parties. A panel of three judges can pick between two outcomes by means of a vote without 
specifying why they prefer one outcome over the other. The same panel cannot produce 
                                               
82 Some of the problems raised by the combination of the unitary nature of the CE Method and the attempt 
to impose a distinction between residual returns associated with market intangibles and other residual returns 
in defining the new taxing right allocated to market jurisdictions might (perhaps) be lessened through reliance 
on underlying managerial accounting figures used to develop financial reporting.  But in that case the 
problems associated with relying on financial accounting with respect to measurements that are of minimal 
independent importance to investors arise.  See fn [y] and accompanying text, infra. 
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that outcome in multiparty disputes.83 As a result, any dispute resolution system intended 
for the CE Method would have to take decisions that formally or informally serve as 
precedent.  Moreover, it is impossible to imagine that governments would allow a panel of 
arbitrators to reach an independent determination of the amount of tax multiple 
jurisdictions should collect from a given MNC, without requiring the arbitrators to explain 
themselves. So, the CE Method requires reason-based multiparty arbitration.   
 
If tax treaties do not provide the arbitration outlet for MNCs to contest multiple inconsistent 
assessments in a CE Method system, MNC litigants would attempt to draw in neighboring 
international economic law regimes to resolve the arising double taxation matters.84 The 
investment and trade treaties that neighbor tax treaties often provide for compulsory 
adjudication (albeit with tax carve-outs built into some agreements). However, they are an 
extraordinarily imperfect fora to interpret and develop the meaning of complex new 
international tax rules that are intended to be of general application.  If tax authorities and 
ministries of finance want to retain any semblance of control of the adjudication that would 
arise in a CE Method system, they would eventually be forced to establish dedicated world 
tax tribunals. The alternative would be to be sidelined by trade officials, investment 
arbitration lawyers, or foreign affairs/state department diplomats. Yet the establishment of 
a world tax court is difficult to imagine given the importance states place on tax 
sovereignty.   
 
If a true multilateral treaty and a world corporate income tax court is an impossibility, the 
CE Method seems extremely challenging to stabilize internationally using mandatory 
binding arbitration.  The tax treaty network, the OECD TPG, the MAP system, and the 
MLI+ Approach in general provide no avenue for stabilizing such a regime, because that 
entire system is by definition bilateral, while the CE Method is fundamentally unitary; even 
worse, unitary with an underlying reliance on facts and circumstances transfer pricing. 
 
3) Stabilizing the OM Method using the MLI Approach 
 
The OM Method would specify the minimum taxable income due from a multinational 
group in a given jurisdiction as a fixed return on sales that would vary based on global 
operating margins.  The OM Method does not rely on taxable income calculations at the 
consolidated group level, nor does it require determining market intangible-related 
                                               
83 There are of course ordinal ranking voting systems that can usually produce a result with any number of 
voters and any number of options.  But this requires creating weighting factors or other tiebreaking systems 
for second and third preferences and has never been used in any legal or arbitral process of which I am aware. 
84 Indeed, such migration has already begun, in part as a result of the growing pressures on the international 
tax regime.  Consider, for example, the tax component of the Yukos v. Russia arbitration, which was arbitrated 
under the Energy Charter Treaty.  Yukos v. Russia, PCA Case No. AA 227, Final Award (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3279.pdf; Panel Report, Argentina – 
Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, WTO Doc. WT/DS453/R (adopted Sept. 30, 2015) (under 
appeal).  Cf. Itai Grinberg and Joost Pauwelyn, The Emergence of a New International Tax Regime: The 
OECD’s Package on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), 19 ASIL Insights 24, 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/19/issue/24/emergence-new-international-tax-regime-
oecd%E2%80%99s-package-base-erosion-and 
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development expenses, product research and development expenses, or any other 
intangible development expenditures at the consolidated group level.  The substantial 
reduction in unitary components makes the OM Method more amenable to implementation 
via the MLI+ Approach than the CE Method.85  86 
 
As in the CE Method, in the OM Method one jurisdiction could determine that it is owed 
more than is appropriate. However, in the OM Method, the deviating jurisdiction would do 
so either by reaching a higher operating margin than is appropriate, or higher revenue 
numbers than are appropriate, or a higher destination percentage for their jurisdiction than 
is appropriate.  As in the CE Method, if this happened it would not be clear which other 
jurisdiction had been harmed.  But in the OM Method the conflicts seem more manageable, 
even if they are multijurisdictional, simply because there are only three levers that can lead 
to inappropriately high allocations to a given market jurisdiction.  Facts and circumstances 
transfer pricing has no role at all.  Moreover, one can imagine relatively clear guidance 
specifying how to calculate the appropriate unitary operating margins and revenue 
numbers, as well as the destination percentage calculation.  In the most basic case, the 
asserted values for overall operating margins and overall revenues would clearly be 
uniform as among jurisdictions, because the system would rely entirely on financial 
accounting principles and audited financial statements.   
 
Moreover, one can at least begin to imagine capturing any additional concepts that would 
be required (destination of sales, measurement of revenues or operating margins on a 
business line basis) in a revised CBCR report that would present relevant figures that 
jurisdictions would then be expected to apply to determine the allocable market profit 
amount. Finally, if a rule specifying when a jurisdiction is a “surrender jurisdiction” was 
also adopted into bilateral treaties through the MLI, MNCs could then use MAP and 
binding arbitration to ask the surrender sovereign to bring a proceeding where a jurisdiction 
was asserting excessive taxing rights.   
 
Special rules to automatically provide information that would further aid in auditing the 
OM Method could be incorporated through a competent authority agreement entered into 
pursuant to Article 6 of the Administrative Assistance Convention (the restrictions of 
Article 22 of the Administrative Assistance Convention should not be material in this 
regard). Such rules could be adopted either as an amendment to the existing country-by-
country reporting architecture, or as an entirely separate multilateral competent authority 
agreement under the auspices of the Administrative Assistance Convention.87   
 
                                               
85 In other words, the basic OM Method is more amenable to implementation through a network of bilateral 
mechanisms because it represents a generally “bottom-up” approach, as contrasted with a “top-down” unitary 
approach. 
86 Note, however, that this conclusion is not intended to suggest that the OM Method is normatively desirable. 
87 While the Administrative Assistance Convention is only able to provide for administrative assistance (and 
not substantive reallocation rules), in the context of a project with distributive consequences, the ability to 
require signing onto a policy amendment to the treaty in order to keep voting rights in future work around 
the project may be a meaningful tool for encouraging compliance.   
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As the OECD points out in a less consequential context, making such arrangements work 
would likely require “consistent reporting of income in each country” that is a party to the 
agreement.88  Consistent reporting is most easily enforced if it is based on some set of 
externally established financial reporting concepts.   
 
 
Applying such reporting arrangements to enforce the OM Method would constitute a 
transformational expansion of competent authority agreements.  Nevertheless, a competent 
authority agreement might be used to further underpin the OM Method.   
 
In sum, at a high level the MLI+ Approach seems more workable for the OM Method than 
for the CE Method.  Three key technical features lead to that result.  First, the OM Method 
relies on a minimum tax architecture.  This means that in many cases the precise results of 
the OM Method are not determinative of tax liability; rather they create incentives for 
MNCs to plan to meet some realistic threshold of liability through transfer pricing.    
Second, it is highly reliant on financial accounting, and therefore to a substantial degree 
avoids the tax base conformity conundrum of unitary taxation.89  Finally, the OM Method 
does not mix arm’s length transfer pricing concepts into the determination of the minimum 
tax amount. 
 
The OM Method in its simplest form largely dispenses with the problems of unitary 
taxation, but in doing so raises questions about the policy consequences of relying on 
financial reporting to obtain tax results.  There is an extensive literature on this subject.  
Tax policymakers, financial market regulators, and others concerned with issues of 
financial accounting policy all have a stake in these types of book-tax conformity 
questions.90   
 
The first fundamental concern of the book-tax conformity literature that has relevance in 
this context involves the interest governments might have in influencing financial reporting 
rules in an environment where those rules determine the allocation of tax revenues as 
among jurisdictions.  Importantly, the relevant financial reporting rules are in principle 
                                               
88 OECD TPG, supra note 36, at ¶ 4.124.  The safe harbors discussion of the OECD TPG observes that a 
multilateral competent authority agreement among jurisdictions in tax treaties with one another “could, by 
agreement, define [one or more] categor[ies] of taxpayers and/or transactions to which a safe harbour 
provision would apply and by agreement establish pricing parameters that would be accepted by each of the 
contracting countries if consistently applied in each of the countries.  Such agreements could be published in 
advance and taxpayers could consistently report results in each of the affected countries in accordance with 
the agreement.”  Id. at ¶ 4.119. 
89 Note that the fact that a portion of all returns rather than just non-routine returns are allocated to the new 
taxing right in the OM Method does not, per se, make it easier to stabilize the OM Method using the MLI+ 
Approach.  But any mechanism to separate routine and non-routine returns would either worsen the problem 
of relying on financial accounting with respect to measurements that are of minimal independent importance 
to investors, trigger the tax base conformity conundrum, or both.   
90 See, e.g., Michelle Hanlon & Edward Maydew, Book-Tax Conformity: Implications for Multinational 
Firms, 62 NAT. TAX J. 127, 139-40 (Mar. 2009).    
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controllable through legislation enacted by residence country jurisdictions. 91  In the OM 
Method, such rules, as potentially altered by residence country legislatures or residence 
country accounting standards-setters, could determine the magnitude of the new taxing 
right that accrues to market country jurisdictions.92 
 
Separately, there is a heated debate in the accounting and finance literature about the 
benefits and burdens of steps to conform any given financial reporting regime with tax 
reporting.93  The key detriments identified for book-tax conformity in the literature are 1) 
a reduction in the quality of information available to investors because reporting is 
manipulated so as to influence tax outcomes; and 2) potential changes in capital structure 
among firms subject to increased book-tax conformity.94  Generally, the literature suggests 
that firms subject to increased book-tax conformity requirements tend to take on more debt 
and reduce equity.95 On the other hand, there are analysts that believe that some forms of 
book-tax conformity can reduce opportunistic reporting to engage in earnings 
management, tax avoidance, or both.96   
                                               
91 Even in the absence of legislative responses, determining minimum tax obligations to market country 
jurisdictions on the basis of financial reporting rules may incentivize MNC management to alter their 
accounting choices.  Theoretically the incentive would be to defer revenue and accelerate expenses.  Study 
of a natural experiment created by certain legal changes in the United States’ 1986 tax reform that made 
certain firms conform their book and tax income showed that firms in fact do engage in this kind of behavior 
when tax liability can be manipulated thereby. Gary Guenther, CRS Report for Congress, The Taxpayer Relief 
Act of 1997: An Overview (1997). Thus, behavioral questions related to increase reliance on financial 
reporting for purposes of allocating taxing rights may be important but are generally beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
92  Separately, the accounting literature on book-tax conformity documents a notable change in capital 
structure among firms subject to increased book-tax conformity.  Generally, these firms tend to take on more 
debt, and reduce equity. Bradley Blaylock, Fabio B. Gaertner & Terry Shevlin, Book-Tax Conformity Capital 
Structure, 22 T. REV. ACCOUNT STUD. 903-932 (Feb. 23, 2017). 
93 See, e.g., Tanya Y. H. Tang, Does Book-Tax Conformity Deter Opportunistic Book and Tax Reporting? 
And International Analyses, 24 EUR. ACCT. REV. 441(June 3, 2014).  
94 See, e.g., Michelle Hanlon & Terry Shevlin, Book-Tax Conformity for Corporate Income: An Introduction 
to the Issues, 19 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 101 (Sept. 2005); Michelle Hanlon, Edward Maydew & Terry Shevlin, 
An Unintended Consequence of Book-Tax Conformity: A Loss of Earnings Informativeness, 46 J. ACCT. & 
ECON. 294 (2008); Michelle Hanlon, Stacey Kelley Laplante & Terry Shevlin, Evidence on the Possible 
Information Loss of Conforming Book Income and Taxable Income, 48 J. L. & ECON. 407 (Oct. 2005)  
95  See generally Bradley Blaylock, Fabio B. Gaertner & Terry Shevlin, Book-Tax Conformity Capital 
Structure, 22 T. REV. ACCOUNT STUD. 903-932 (Feb. 23, 2017). 
96 See, e.g., Mihir Desai & Dhammika Dharampala, Earnings Management, Corporate Tax Shelters, and 
Book-Tax Alignment, HBS Finance Working Paper No. 884812 (Jan. 19, 2009) (concluding that the corporate 
governance view of taxation recommends an increased reliance on alignment of financial and tax accounting 
whenever possible); Mihir Desai & Dhammika Dharampala, Corporate Tax Avoidance and High-Powered 
Incentives, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 145 (2006); Judith Freedman, Aligning Taxable Profits and Accounting Profits: 
Acounting Standards, Legislators and Judges, 2 E-J. TAX RESEARCH (Jan 7. 2005); Wolfgang Shön, The Odd 
Couple: A Common Future for Financial and Tax Accounting, 58 TAX L. REV. 111 (Dec. 2005). In the last 
fifteen years, however, many countries (including, for example, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, and 
Russia) have moved away from basing their financial reporting standards on tax rules, and instead have 
chosen to rely on international financial reporting standards (“IFRS”).  As a result, these countries have in 
effect moved from a tax-based financial accounting system to a book-tax independent system.  See, e.g., Tang, 
supra note 97 (pointing out that Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, and Russia all made the change to 
boo k-tax independent systems in the last fifteen years). 
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If the OM Method were pursued, it would seem imperative to determine how the 
accounting and finance policymaking and private sector communities might analyze the 
particular form of book-tax conformity represented by the OM Method. After all, under the 
OM Method, the OECD and tax administrators would be relying on financial regulators to 
maintain rules that would allow the OM Method to be enforced.   
 
Moreover, if the system relies on financial reporting measurements to determine Pillar One 
outcomes, decisions made by financial auditors at the Big 4 accounting firms would 
determine the allocation of corporate tax revenues as among governments.  Outsourcing 
the allocation of taxing rights as among sovereigns to private sector advisors may raise 
concerns about blurring the line between the appropriate roles of government and the 
private sector.   
 
Further, all four of the Big Four accounting firms are decentralized (although they are 
publicly branded as a single entity, they each in fact consist of a series of independent 
national partnerships). In a financial reporting-driven Pillar One system, the relevant 
auditing decisions would be made in the country of residence. Thus, for example, a UK-
headquartered MNC would be audited in the UK.  Query if non-UK market jurisdictions 
would be comfortable with a private UK financial auditing partnership that is unrelated to 
any entity in the relevant market jurisdiction deciding how much tax revenue should be 
allocated to non-UK market jurisdictions by UK-headquartered MNCs.  Separately, query 
whether the non-tax financial auditing components of the Big 4 would have concerns about 
this new role.   
 
a. Country Pairs without Bilateral Tax Treaties 
 
Importantly, even as among the thirty-seven largest world economies (representing 90% of 
global GDP), 20% of the bilateral country pairs do not have tax treaties with one another.97  
Thus the OM Method, even if implemented fully through the MLI+ Approach would not 
be fully enforceable through treaties.  An open question in this regard is whether, with 80% 
treaty coverage, the remaining country pairs (and other countries pairs lacking a tax treaty 
with each other) would gravitate towards general compliance with the OM Method.   
 
The first question is whether jurisdictions would follow a revised OECD TPG on OM 
Method deemed profit amounts in circumstances where they were not in a tax treaty with 
the designated surrender jurisdiction.  Using the OECD TPG as a primary vehicle to 
stabilize the OM Method in these circumstances does not initially seem viable.  Changes 
to the OECD TPG will tend not to have the same distinctive legal force as changes to the 
OECD Model Treaty. Various countries (including a number of the largest economies) 
treat the OECD TPG as merely advisory. Moreover, countries that are not in tax treaties 
with one another generally cannot enter competent authority agreements (or advanced 
pricing agreements) with one another. 
 
                                               
97 Skadden Consultation Document, supra note 29. 
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On the other hand, a true multilateral treaty might not be needed to simulate the relevant 
arrangements between non-treaty pairs. Rather, to stabilize the most basic OM Method, a 
substantial degree of internalized transgovernmental comity as among taxing authorities 
might be imperfect, but sufficient.  Furthermore, in principle domestic law on both the 
market country and surrender jurisdiction sides could in effect mimic the outcome of the 
OM Method as instantiated into treaties.   
 
History does provide some reason to hope such comity is possible.  The relative stability 
of the international tax system over the course of a fifty year period from the late 1950s 
until the financial crisis (in the absence of a multilateral organization with legal force), 
suggests that when disaggregated from broader political pressures, tax administrators in 
transnational networks tend to form a epistemic community with fairly strong 
internalization of norms. When politicization of international tax enforcement was low, 
caring about one’s reputation among one’s peers transnationally appears to have played an 
important role for international tax administrators.98  Indeed, the creation of the OECD’s 
Forum on Tax Administration was premised on the idea that those pressures could be 
mobilized to ensure greater harmonization and coordination among tax administrations.   
Moreover, domestic law and tax treaty standards converged on many important issues over 
the course of the latter half of the 20th century. 
 
Unfortunately, scholarship suggests that as the political salience of an issue increases, the 
likelihood of agreed concepts among participants in transnational regulatory communities 
declines.99  Instead, calculations about domestically determined national interests (logics 
of consequences) increasingly trump technocratic and transnationally constructed 
understandings of policy coherence (logics of appropriateness).100  These dynamics are 
especially powerful when the issues at hand have distributive consequences, as for example 
with respect to resources as among states.101   
 
The post-BEPS experience provides yet another example for this general finding in the 
political economy literature. Catalyzed by a high level of political attention to the taxation 
of multinational enterprises, agreements of a conceptual nature were reached in the BEPS 
project at a speed that was not imaginable pre-BEPS. Some of those agreements 
                                               
98 Cf. ANNE MARIE SLAUGHTER, THE NEW WORLD ORDER 54 (Princeton Univ. Press 2005). 
99 See Itai Grinberg, The New International Tax Diplomacy, citing, among others, DANIEL DREZNER, ALL 
POLITICS IS GLOBAL:  EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY REGIMES (2007); STEPHEN D. KRASNER, 
SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999) (arguing that in the international system, when decisions are 
made by actors subject to or cognizant of domestic political pressures, logics of consequences, meaning 
rational calculation designed to maximize a given set of unexplained national preferences, tend to trump 
logics of appropriateness, meaning, for example, regulator community understandings about policy 
coherence and consequent “appropriate” courses of action for sovereigns); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, The 
Political Economy of International Financial Regulation, 88 IND. L. REV. 1405 (2013). 
100 See Grinberg, supra note 104.  
101 C.f  Peter J. Katzenstein, BETWEEN POWER AND PLENTY: FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES OF ADVANCED 
INDUSTRIAL STATES (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).  Moreover, logics of appropriateness 
are at their weakest when there is no principle for a result, as is the case in the OM Method, where a somewhat 
arbitrary formulaic scale must be used to determine what percentage of sales revenue should be labeled 
market profit at any given level of operating margin. 
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meaningfully reduced opportunities for base erosion and profit shifting. Others (most 
notably the transfer pricing outcomes) were failures that added confusion. Overall, 
however, the complete package is most fairly judged to have reduced opportunities for base 
erosion and profit shifting.   
 
Nevertheless, the BEPS project’s success did not prevent what the OECD called the specter 
of “international tax chaos” when it embarked on the BEPS project in 2013.102   The 
budding tax/trade war over the French DST is just the tip of the iceberg.  Simply look at 
the growing backlog of mutual agreement procedure disputes that the OECD itself has 
chronicled; pending MAP cases have more than doubled since the BEPS project began. 
This statistic understates the magnitude of the problem, because of the growing phenomena 
of competent authorities refusing to allow disputes to enter the competent authority 
processes.   
 
A key reason the BEPS project’s success in reducing opportunities for base erosion and 
profit shifting did not translate into preventing international tax chaos, is the continuing 
high level of politicization of international tax policy.  High levels of politicization 
encourage domestic politics to focus on responses to international tax issues.  In contrast, 
in a depoliticized international tax environment, internalization of norms and concern 
regarding reputation as among the transnational community of international tax 
administrators and bureaucrats could act as an informal mechanism to help reduce disputes.  
This idea is already alive at the OECD and is implicitly embedded in the work being done 
under the heading of the “Tax Certainty Agenda.” 103 Moreover, bureaucrats have greater 
authority over tax policy and legislation in such environments.   
 
However, for international peer pressure mechanisms to work to stabilize something like 
the OM Method, depoliticization of corporate international tax policy would be required.  
Transnational regulatory interactions that produce shared interpretation and 
internalization—the kind of interactions that former U.S. State Department Legal Adviser 
and Yale Law School Dean Harold Koh once labeled “transnational jawboning”—work 
much more effectively when the domestic political pressures faced by the working level 
bureaucrats are lower. 
 
For international tax administration to become more consensual and less conflict-ridden, 
international tax policy would need to be returned to the hands of the technocrats.104 Today, 
leading political figures in the U.S. and Europe take positions with respect to corporate 
international tax multilateral debates for the purpose of strengthening their hand in 
domestic political fights.  If that stopped, to paraphrase Robert Putnam, the actors in the 
                                               
102 OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(2013), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf. 
103  See, e.g. FTA Santiago Communiqué (2019) [hereinafter Santiago Communiqué], available at 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/forum-on-tax-administration/events/forum-on-tax-administration-communique-
2019.pdf.  
104 For example, regulatory agreements intended to force public disclosure of information can create non-
excludable benefits that are also largely non-rival among G20 countries, thereby approaching a global public 
good, which facilitates agreement.   
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international tax game would again play only on their own multilateral board, and not be 
pawns on their respective domestic political game boards as well.105   They would still, of 
course, face domestic interest group pressures, but these would not “reach a high political 
level,” in the manner the OECD has repeatedly stated international corporate tax matters 
have done since 2012.106 
 
At the tax administration level, depoliticization of international tax matters would clearly 
bolster the importance of transnational reputational capital in ways that are likely to 
improve comity and be highly beneficial to the tax certainty agenda.  Joint audits, the FTA 
large business international programme, ICAP, and multilateral APAs and MAP are all 
more likely to be effective, not just in solving specific disputes, but in ensuring consistent 
internalization of norms as among tax administrators in an environment where those tax 
administrators are subject to only limited domestic political pressures.107  Even peer review 
on issues such as whether audits are being undertaken consistent with “Pillar One 
standards” would likely be more effective if peer review were depoliticized.  The key 
would be to have peer review that was in fact for peers, rather than in order to produce 
summary reports to the finance ministers of the G20.   
 
Accomplishing the requisite depoliticization would certainly require insulating steps from 
finance ministers and national leaders, but also from the OECD Secretariat.  At the OECD 
level, it would require the OECD Secretariat holding fewer high-visibility global policy 
network events that bring together businesses, NGOs, and other stakeholders with 
government officials.  It would require the OECD to return to a more exclusive focus on 
organizing transgovernmental meetings that tackle technical questions, the role for which 
the OECD is justly most well-known.108   At the level of the Secretary General and other 
senior OECD officials, it would require prioritizing a longer-term, quality policy outcome 
in international corporate taxation over high-profile processes and institutional 
prominence.  
 
C. Stabilizing the CE or the OM Methods using a Multilateral Treaty 
 
If depoliticization is not possible, there is always the other path to stabilizing either the CE 
or the OM Method.  This path would involve a true multilateral treaty.   
 
1) Stabilizing the CE Method using a Multilateral Treaty 
 
The Multilateral Treaty Approach is the only way to stabilize a system that includes CE 
Method components. A true multilateral instrument, unlike the OECD MLI, could create 
formal, collective state-to-state obligations. For this reason, a multilateral treaty with some 
meaningful enforcement mechanism is capable of stabilizing many different Pillar One 
                                               
105  Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Policy; The Logic of Two-Level Games, 43 International 
Organizations 427 (1988). 
106 Given the relatively small percentage of national revenue that cross-border taxation generates, this result 
is quite plausible.   
107 See, e.g. Santiago Communique, supra note 109.  
108 Anne Marie Slaughter describes the OECD as “the quintessential host of transgovernmental regulatory 
networks.”  SLAUGHTER, supra note 104, at 46. 
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proposals.  Unitary components (taxable income calculations at the consolidated group 
level, a unitary concept of market intangible expense, etc.) still would raise challenges, but 
rules for consistent measurement and reporting principles and dispute resolution are much 
more likely to be stable if inscribed into a multilateral treaty.  For the same reason, a split 
between routine and non-routine returns or between non-routine returns attributable to 
market intangibles and other intangibles becomes somewhat more administrable.   Informal 
comity among tax administrators is less important in the presence of a multilateral treaty. 
Rather, the principle stabilization mechanism could be through domestic court-based 
enforcement mechanisms, combined with a transnational arbitral process.   
 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties also provides for an additional enforcement 
mechanism in the case of a true multilateral treaty that is never available in the bilateral tax 
treaties familiar to tax lawyers (or in the case of the MLI).  In the event of a material breach 
of a true multilateral treaty by one of the parties, Article 60.2 of the Vienna Convention 
allows a party “specially affected” by the breach to suspend the treaty in whole or in part, 
not only in relations between itself and the defaulting party, but in relation to all parties.  
The idea is that in an interdependent multilateral treaty, performance of the treaty by each 
state is a necessary condition of performance by all other states.  The consequence in the 
context of taxation is that if a government believes another sovereign is fundamentally 
failing to uphold the treaty it can bring meaningful legal pressure to bear from the entire 
global treaty network to attempt to rectify the situation. 
 
However, high levels of political will would be required to accept the requisite constraints 
on sovereign autonomy that a true multilateral treaty entails. Historically, jurisdictions have 
been reticent to sign such a multilateral tax treaty because of the perception that it would 
reduce tax sovereignty.  For over a hundred years, various academics and multilaterally 
oriented policymakers have dreamed of a true multilateral tax treaty (or a world tax court).  
But countries have never been interested—the desire to preserve tax sovereignty has 
always been too strong.  Instead, governments have used domestic legislation and bilateral 
treaties to reach the appropriate balance between national sovereignty and international 
cooperation in the tax area.109  Only shared conviction at the finance minister and leader 
level is likely to overcome the traditional concern that a true multilateral instrument (with, 
for example, a dispute resolution body) would undermine sovereign autonomy in the tax 
area.   
 
The question is whether this is a sufficiently cooperative moment in the history of 
international economic relations such that the political willpower for creating entirely new 
legal instruments and institutions for multilateral global tax coordination will arise.110      
                                               
109 OECD, Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Treaties, Action 15 – 2015 Final Report, 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (2015), available at 
https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241688-en. 
110 See, e.g., Richard M. Bird, Shaping a New International Order, BULL. INT’L Fisc. Doc. 292, 297 (1988) 
(characterizing the desire for a world tax system as "utopian" and unrealistic). Even in circumstances where 
political will has been quite strong, multilateral tax treaty negotiations have often failed.  For example, the 
first attempt to make a collective agreement on direct taxes, by the States of succession of the Austro-
Hungarian dual monarchy, failed due to non-ratification (the so-called 'Rome treaty of 1922').  In July 1963, 
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2) Certain Outcomes are Practically Impossible to Stabilize 
 
 
Importantly, even if a true multilateral treaty were agreed to, it would not fundamentally 
resolve the stabilization challenges that would arise if the chosen Pillar One solution mixed 
arm’s length transfer pricing and unitary taxation components.  In the true multilateral 
treaty case, the problem is not one of legal impossibility.  However, even a multilateral 
treaty cannot solve the problem of administrative overload.  In other words, a system where 
a residual return must be calculated on a unitary basis at the level of the consolidated group, 
but the determination of what constitutes a residual return involves applying conventional 
bilateral transfer pricing concepts, means that every jurisdiction now has an interest in what 
were traditionally purely bilateral disputes, regardless of the legal instrument that 
instantiates that system.  Unlike the MLI+ Approach, a true multilateral treaty could, in 
theory, include a mechanism to resolve the resulting disputes. However, as a practical 
matter it is hard to see how the multilateral treaty would create sufficient dispute resolution 
capacity. The system would likely suffer from administrative overload and collapse under 
its own weight.  When every jurisdiction has an interest in the size of the residual, which 
another jurisdiction claims should be allocated under arm’s length pricing to the routine 
returns part of the system, the potential for disputes is just too high.   
 
3) Stabilizing the OM Method using a Multilateral Treaty 
 
One should also note that if a true multilateral instrument were to be agreed upon, it would 
have a number of clear advantages over any other approach for purposes of stabilizing the 
OM Method.  First, it is much easier to ensure that formulaic market profit amounts based 
on operating margins are uniform and remain uniform over time in a true multilateral 
instrument.  The rules in an MLI can always be superseded by subsequent bilateral treaties.  
In contrast, a multilateral treaty can be structured to prevent subsequent bilateral treaties 
from undermining the broader system.  Second, the enforcement mechanisms in a true 
multilateral treaty would probably be more robust.111  
 
Moreover, a rule specifying when a jurisdiction is a “surrender jurisdiction” will be clearer 
and more effective in a multilateral treaty than under the MLI+ Approach.  Relatedly, a 
true multilateral treaty incorporating the OM Method would be more likely to produce a 
                                               
the OECD asked what was then the Fiscal Committee 'to report to the Council, as and when appropriate, on 
the feasibility of concluding a Multilateral Convention for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to 
taxes on income and capital among all Member countries of the OECD'.  That report was never successfully 
concluded.  In 1964 the council of the European Free Trade Area appointed a working party to examine the 
question of whether a multilateral tax treaty as among the members of EFTA was technically feasible and 
workable.  After five years they concluded it was not.  The only existing multilateral tax treaties I am aware 
of (the Nordic treaty and the Andean treaty) are not truly multilateral; rather they are reducible to a set of 
bilateral pair agreements. 
111  The OM Method depends on consistently calculated operating margins, revenues, and destination 
determinations.  Each of these numbers must necessarily be calculated at the consolidated group level, and 
likely requires information from the parent’s residence jurisdiction to audit effectively.  A multilateral 
instrument could easily enshrine such audit assistance.  However, as described earlier, such assistance can 
also be provided through the Multilateral Administrative Assistance Convention.   
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stable arrangement for addressing loss companies than an OM Method instantiated into 
law via the MLI+ Approach.   
 
In the MLI+ Approach, the relevant international law in a profit allocation dispute will 
often be a bilateral tax treaty between an intermediate holding company jurisdiction and a 
market jurisdiction.  Such instruments are ill-suited to a rule that creates an exception based 
on the loss position of an MNC headquartered in a third country that is not a party to the 
relevant bilateral treaty.  Special rules for loss companies are easier to imagine both being 
negotiated and remaining operative in a true multilateral instrument.  The loss company 
concern is not a secondary issue: approximately 20% of multinational firms globally have 
negative earnings before interest and taxes in any given year.  
 
D. Reflecting on the Key Dimensions:  Still One Overwhelming Issue, And Now 
Six Additional Important Considerations  
 
Where does all this leave us?  In this paper, the ultimate question is what key structural 
decisions would make it easier or harder to stabilize any Pillar One proposal, and what 
questions remain unanswered that would help guide those decisions. 
 
The number one technical question for any Pillar One proposal is defining the destination 
of sales (without a VAT mechanism to address intermediary distributors and related 
issues).  The destination of sales is the gating issue:  without an answer to this question, no 
Pillar One solution is viable.  This problem is described in some detail in my earlier work.  
Serious attention to the question of how to define destination without reliance on a VAT 
mechanism is urgently needed.   
 
One key insight of this paper is that the destination problem is somewhat diminished in a 
minimum tax structure. The problem is less severe because the destination fraction for any 
given jurisdiction does not necessarily have an impact on final liability to that jurisdiction.   
Nevertheless, the minimum tax architecture does not adequately resolve the destination 
fraction issue.  What can be said at this juncture is that one would think that a multilateral 
treaty would more easily instantiate a shared definition of destination into law than an 
MLI+ Approach.112  
 
Setting destination aside leaves the six structural decisions that were at the heart of this 
paper.  What did analysis of the strawmen teach us about those six key structural decisions?  
 
First, the analysis shows that the decision to impose a distinction between routine returns 
and non-routine returns in defining the new taxing right, is not as important to the 
stabilization question as one might intuit.  Rather, the key is how the distinction between 
routine and non-routine returns is determined.  The same is true for any distinction between 
                                               
112 The point that ex ante a multilateral treaty seems better than the MLI Approach is somewhat obvious.  Of 
course, the counterpoint is that a multilateral treaty is harder to agree upon.  The bottom line remains that the 
CE Method, the OM Method, and all options on the continuum in between require a destination definition. 
Figuring out how to stabilize the definition multilaterally is ancillary to coming up with a definition in the 
first place.   
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residual returns associated with market intangibles and other residual returns.  The central 
point highlighted in the analysis, is that if traditional transfer pricing and valuation concepts 
are incorporated into a methodology to make either of these two distinctions, the system 
becomes irreparably unstable.   
 
The problem of distinguishing between routine and non-routine returns at the unitary level 
while applying transfer pricing concepts is even worse if an MLI+ approach is used to 
implement the system.  But that is not the key point.  Rather the central takeaway is in 
effect that a system that mixes 1) a new taxing right that is based on any destination 
principle with 2) traditional transfer pricing concepts, cannot possibly be stabilized.  Even 
a true multilateral treaty cannot realistically solve the problem.113 
 
Second, unitary calculations to define the new taxing right allocated to market jurisdictions 
are not amenable to being stabilized using the MLI+ Approach.  The basic OM Method is 
easier to stabilize than the CE Method in an MLI+ Approach for the reason that it nearly 
eliminates reliance on unitary elements. Where it does rely on unitary elements, it relies 
entirely on financial and managerial accounting measurements.  The conclusion holds but 
is substantially weakened if the OM Method is applied by business line and therefore uses 
a limited number of measurements that build on, but are not required by, current financial 
reporting principles.  In that case, one might imagine the measurements being sufficiently 
discrete that they might be added to CbC-style reporting in an enforceable and 
administrable manner.   
 
Third, if the chosen Pillar One approach relies on financial reporting, the policy questions 
that arise out of relying on financial accounting to determine tax results must be addressed.  
The three most important questions revolve around:  
• the potential for residence jurisdictions to change accounting principles in light of 
the Pillar One agreement;  
• the level of comfort that market jurisdictions can achieve with private sector 
financial auditors in residence jurisdictions determining the amount of tax revenue 
being allocated to market jurisdictions;  
• the concerns that might be raised by financial regulators with book-tax conformity 
that makes financial accounting standards (rather than legislated tax accounting 
rules) primary; and 
 
Fourth, a minimum tax architecture to implement the new taxing right allocated to market 
jurisdictions substantially relieves pressure on any version of the Pillar One new taxing 
right relative to a final liability rule.  In many cases, a minimum tax architecture would 
create incentives for MNCs to build transfer pricing structures that align with the new 
taxing right. 
 
Conclusion 
 
                                               
113 Note that this criticism would also extend to the so-called RPA-I proposal made by Devereux, 
Auerbach, Oosterhuis, Schön and Vella. Devereux et al, supra note 35.  
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One major stated goal of the current OECD work programme is to maintain or reestablish 
international tax order.  The Pillar One effort to reallocate taxing rights raises important 
questions regarding whether this goal can be achieved. In 2019, the Inclusive Framework 
has committed to determining the general approach they wish to pursue under Pillar One. 
It is important that participating country delegates consider during that period, and not only 
thereafter, what legal and political instruments would be required to implement and 
stabilize any given Pillar One approach.  
 
Six key structural decisions that can impact the ability to stabilize the international tax 
architecture are likely to be implicitly taken in choosing a general approach for Pillar One.   
The six key decisions with respect to the new taxing right allocated to market jurisdictions 
are:   
 
1. Whether or not to attempt to impose a distinction between routine returns and non-
routine returns in defining the new taxing right  
2. Whether or not to attempt to impose a distinction between residual returns 
associated with market intangibles and other residual returns  
3. Whether or not to include traditional transfer pricing concepts as a component of 
the Pillar One solution  
4. Whether or not to rely on consolidated tax base (unitary) calculations  
5. Whether and how to use financial reporting concepts  
6. Whether or not to use a minimum tax architecture  
 
The decisions reached along these six dimensions will determine what set of tools have 
any chance of stabilizing the agreed upon architecture.   
 
The paper used two strawmen—the CE Method and the OM Method—to examine whether 
any set of answers to the six questions raised above can be successfully stabilized, and 
which tools would be required to do so.   
 
First, I conclude that no version of the new taxing right of Pillar One can be stabilized using 
the G20 Soft Law Approach.   
 
Second, I conclude that the simplest version of the OM Method might be implemented 
using the MLI+ Approach. That is to say, a combination of tools previously used 
multilaterally by the OECD in the international tax area could be used to stabilize the OM 
Method.  It would, however, be less stable than implementing the same Pillar One concept 
through a true multilateral instrument.  One important reason a multilateral treaty is 
preferable is that the MLI+ Approach is ill-suited to deal with MNCs with losses, and about 
20% of MNC have negative EBIT every year.  Moreover, using the MLI+ Approach to 
implement the OM Method would raise significant questions about the consequences of 
relying on book-tax conformity, and the issues raised there are not limited to issues of tax 
policy.  Policymakers from other technical domains will have an important stake in such 
decisions.   
 
Third, I conclude that as one moves further from the simplifying conventions of the OM 
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Method, a truly multilateral treaty becomes increasingly essential.   
 
Fourth, even a Pillar One approach based on a true multilateral treaty will fail if the 
approach attempts to incorporate traditional transfer pricing principles within the new 
taxing right itself; the amount of the new taxing right must be defined without regard to 
facts and circumstances transfer pricing if there is to be any hope of stabilizing the regime.   
 
Finally, determining the destination of sales is a gating issue for any Pillar One proposal.  
Although that problem is beyond the scope of this paper, it was addressed in detail in my 
earlier work. 114  Absent a workable solution to the destination determination issue 
stabilizing Pillar One is not possible.   
 
 
 
 
                                               
114 Itai Grinberg, International Taxation in an Era of Digital Disruption: Analyzing the Current Debate, 
TAXES 85-118 (Mar. 2019). 
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